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REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE: 
GOVERNMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
POOLS AS A CASE STUDY IN THE GOVERNANCE 
ROLE PLAYED BY REINSURANCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
MARCOS ANTONIO MENDOZA1 
 
*** 
Scholars have eloquently detailed the “Insurance as Governance” 
concept, the potential capacity for reinsurer regulatory influence on insurers, and 
the many aspects under which these theories may arise.  This Article takes the next 
step in analyzing the complex reinsurer-insurer relationship through empirical 
research into how carriers are actually influenced by reinsurers, and what effect 
this has on the parties. 
As a case study in the governance role played by reinsurance institutions, 
this Article organizes survey interview responses of senior officials in the 
governmental entity self-insured risk management pool sector into four distinct 
discussion areas: (i) how reinsurers influence pools in general and in the key 
areas of underwriting, claims, and finance/solvency; (ii) the duty of utmost good 
faith and its effect; (iii) the level to which pools afford accommodation to 
reinsurers; and (iv) whether reinsurer influence varies based on pool 
circumstances, or external factors.  While analysis of the data collected showed 
varying degrees of regulation or governance by reinsurers, the Article concludes 
that not only does a form of reinsurance influence or ‘governance’ clearly exist in 
the largely unregulated world of self-insured pools, whether characterized as 
direct, indirect, or regulatory in nature, but also that the governance effect is an 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article will discuss, as part of the ‘insurance as governance’2 
debate, to what degree reinsurers can ‘govern’ or ‘regulate’ insurers.  
Professor Aviva Abramovsky first addressed the impact of reinsurers on 
insurers in Reinsurance: the Silent Regulator?,3 indicating that reinsurers 
had a potential contractual influence on the insurance industry, therefore 
reinsurers must be part of the regulatory discussion.4 While Professor 
Abramovsky outlined the potential impact of reinsurers on insurers quite 
well, it is important to hear from industry officials themselves to confirm 
the existence of any contractual influence rising to the point of a 
governance or regulatory role. 5 Since there are many complex issues in the 
reinsurer-insurer relationship, this Article’s focus will be to answer how the 
carriers are actually influenced by reinsurers, and what effect this has on 
the parties. 
Evidence gathered for this Article from senior officials in the 
governmental entity risk management pooling industry, carriers that are 
largely unregulated by insurance departments in most states, indicated 
varying degrees of regulation or governance by their reinsurers.  However, 
this governance operates in the foreground, with the open acknowledgment 
of both pool and reinsurer, much like a homeowner and their neighborhood 
association.  Overall, it is beneficial for both the reinsurer and the insurer.   
This Article will examine:   
 In Part II, Background—the history of self-funded pooling 
and typical legal construction; an overview of reinsurance operative 
concepts;6 the basic theories of insurance and reinsurance as governance; 
and the overview of this original research; 
                                                                                                                 
2 ‘Governance’ is defined as “controlling, directing, or regulating influence; 
control, sway, mastery.”  THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE ENGLISH OXFORD 
DICTIONARY 1181 (18th ed. 1979).  ‘Regulating influence’ and ‘sway’ will be the 
focus of this Article.  
3 Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 
345 (2009).  
4 Id. at 405. 
5 The second part of Prof. Abramovsky’s premise, that reinsurers must be 
discussed as part of the insurance regulatory process because of their regulatory-
type influence, is outside the scope of this Article.   
6 Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 350–75, has a more detailed overview of the 
reinsurance process. 
2014 REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 55 
 
 In Part III, Research Survey Methodology—a brief review of 
how the survey was conducted and the participants chosen;  
 In Part IV, Survey Results—the distinct influences of 
reinsurance on pools, the effect of utmost good faith, the accommodation of 
pools, and factors affecting reinsurer influence; and 
 In Part V, Conclusion—how reinsurers create the governance 
effect. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
To frame the discussion accurately, Part II first outlines the history 
of governmental entity pools, including the Texas model as an example.  
Second, it provides an overview of reinsurance concepts.  Finally, Part II 
discusses the basic theories of insurance and reinsurance as governance. 
 
A.   BRIEF HISTORY OF GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY POOLS AND THE 
TEXAS MODEL 
 
Governmental entity pools, which are self-funded cooperatives, 
operate as ‘insurance’ carriers for most governmental entities today, and 
are largely not subject to states’ regulation.7 Although they are not 
considered insurance, these pools extend nearly identical coverage through 
similar underwriting and claim activities, as well as provide other risk 
management services.  Though pools are a small segment in the insuring 
market in terms of capital, their history shows that pools have a growing 
impact in that market. 
The relatively short history of pooling in the United States gives a 
perspective of how pooling became a viable risk management alternative 
for governmental entities.  Pooling has been defined as “. . . a risk 
financing mechanism whereby a group of public entities contribute to a 
shared fund that in turn pays claims for and provides service to the 
participating entity.”8   
                                                                                                                 
7 Even in states where pools are generally unregulated by their insurance 
department, like Texas, certain lines of coverage may be individually regulated by 
statute; e.g., for political subdivision pools regarding workers’ compensation, TEX. 
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 504.001 et. seq. (West 2006).  
8 Harold Pumford, Address at the 2012 AGRiP Spring Conference (Mar. 5, 
2012). A related PowerPoint presentation is available from AGRiP, available at 
http://www.agrip.org. 
56  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 21.1 
 
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board #10 describes it 
as: 
 
A cooperative group of governmental entities joining 
together to finance an exposure, liability, or risk.  Risk may 
include property and liability, workers’ compensation, or 
employee health care.  A pool may be a stand-alone entity 
or included as part of a larger governmental entity that acts 
as the pool’s sponsor.9 
 
In other words, when two or more independent public entities wish 
to share risk, they may do so by forming a pool, rather than independently 
going to the market to obtain coverage. 
Pools are both risk-finance and risk-transfer mechanisms.  The 
member entities of the pools transfer their exposures (minus a deductible) 
to the pool, sharing with other entities in the pool the transfer of related 
risks.10 The services (underwriters, claim operations, loss prevention/risk 
management, reinsurance purchasing) are provided by the pool, or by third 
parties retained by the pool.11 Pools do not issue an insurance policy, but a 
similarly functioning document called a ‘plan document’ or ‘coverage 
agreement’ that is a contract for coverage between the member entity and 
the pool.  Under the agreement, the pool will indemnify the member based 
on the terms and conditions of the coverage agreement in exchange for a 
‘contribution,’ rather than a ‘premium.’12 These coverage agreements 
operate essentially like insurance policies, with coverage terms, exclusions, 
exceptions to exclusions, coverage territories, and coverage periods.13 
These agreements typically have coverage for general liability, professional 
liability, auto liability, property, and workers compensation, utilizing both 
claims-made and occurrence-based agreements.14 
                                                                                                                 
9 Gov’tal Acct. Stds. Bd., Statement No. 10 of the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board, in GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SERIES 49 (Nov. 
1989).   
10 Jason E. Doucette, Note, Wading Into the Pool: Interlocal Cooperation in 
Municipal Insurance and the State Regulation of Public Entity Risk Sharing 
Pools—a Survey, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 533, 537 (2002) (hereinafter Doucette). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 537–38. 
14 General liability, auto liability, property, and workers compensation 
coverages are typically occurrence based, while professional liability is typically 
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Pools have many advantages over insurers for their members.  
They tend to protect their members from cyclic insurance rates,15 offer loss 
prevention services, offer savings (as they are non-profit organizations and 
do not lose funds through broker fees), and have focus and expertise in 
governmental entities not often found in insurers.16 However, pools’ typical 
disadvantage for their members is that they are generally unregulated.  
Therefore, their only duties are those outlined in the coverage agreements 
with their members, and they are not generally subject to prompt payment 
acts, bad faith claims, or penalties.17 
Self-insured governmental pooling has its roots in the United States 
in 1974 after the Texas legislature allowed entities to form pools to self-
insure.18 During this period, public entity officials in all states had concerns 
                                                                                                                 
claims-made based.  Occurrence based relies on the date of the occurrence for 
determining coverage, while claims-made depends on the date the claim is made 
and reported to the carrier.   
15 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–39 (1987), has an excellent discussion of market cycles and 
their causes. 
16 Yuhua Qiao, The New Generation of Public Risk Pools: What Is New?, 1–2  
(on file with author). 
17 It is the author’s experience that this tends to be mitigated because pools 
have limited markets and therefore inherently attempt to service members 
promptly to maintain their member base. Most operational charters limit the 
potential membership, so even though a pool has a potential market of 1000 or 
more members, it is still quite a finite number compared to markets for insurers.  
Even if entities sign an interlocal agreement it usually does not obligate them to be 
in the pool—it just gives them the option to be in the pool if they pay their annual 
contribution, so high levels of service are inherently necessary to keep members. 
See, e.g., App. D.  The member potentially may go in and out of the pool in various 
lines of coverage. Infra App. D, ¶¶ 2, 3, and 4.  However, most pools are organized 
so the governing boards are comprised of members’ representatives. Doucette, 
supra note 10, at 538. This board representation gives pool members direct input as 
to policy.   
18 The author has found no evidence of a pool’s formation prior to January 4, 
1974, when the Texas Association of School Boards, Inc., legally formed the 
TASB Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurance Fund, although several pools claim 
senior status. The formation documents are on file with TASB, Inc. The TASB 
WCSIF merged into the TASB Risk Management Fund in 1997. History and 
Mission, TASB RISK MGMT. FUND, https://www.tasbrmf.org/About/History-and-
Mission.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). While California may claim precursor 
legislation since 1949 regarding the ability of municipalities to act jointly, risk 
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that the insurance industry was charging excessive premiums when 
compared to the exposures,19 and that coverage and services developed for 
the private sector did not adequately address public needs.20 The core 
reason for the actions taken by the insurance industry was the view that, 
due to the loss of many governmental immunities throughout this time 
period, insurers had to increase premiums for governmental entities and 
limit coverage for ordinary governmental activities, such as providing 
parks and swimming pools.  This led to a choice for governments: pay the 
higher premiums for insurance, potentially limiting services and raising 
taxes, or forgo insurance to self-insure, risking bankruptcy from large 
judgments.21 Self-insuring was especially difficult for smaller local 
governments, since the government’s local tax base was the source of 
income.  Lacking a sufficiently broad tax base, a small government was in 
the difficult position of being unable to afford coverage, as well as lacking 
the ability to pay any large judgments, should it go uninsured.22 
Pools began their operations by capitalization through member 
deposits or bond issues; some were not capitalized at all.23 Coverage was 
the initial and primary concern for the governmental entities, but these 
pools also developed loss prevention programs for their members.  Public 
agencies traditionally viewed insurance buying as little more than fulfilling 
a requirement of a government code, and it was rare for a carrier to offer 
loss prevention services for a public risk.24 
Risk pool professionals formed industry associations to assist in the 
development of this new industry.  The Public Risk Management 
Association’s (PRIMA)25 section on pooling formed in 1978, and 
                                                                                                                 
pooling itself was not authorized in California until 1975. Doucette, supra note 10, 
at 547. Texas prevails, as usual. 
19 See generally James R. Hackney, Jr., Note, A Proposal for Funding 
Municipal Tort Liability, 98 YALE L.J. 389 (1988). 
20 See generally Karen Nixon, Public Entity Pooling—Built to Last (2011), 
http://www.cajpa.org/documents/Public-Entity-Pooling-Built-to-Last.pdf. 
21 See Hackney, supra note 19, at 389. 
22 Doucette, supra note 10, at 534–35 (citing Louis P. Vitullo & Scott J. 
Peters, Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Municipal Insurance Crisis, 30 
DEPAUL L. REV. 325, 334) (1981)). 
23 Nixon, supra note 20, at 1. 
24 Id. at 2.   
25 The Association’s mission is to promote effective risk management in the 
public interest as an essential component of public administration. See Strategic 
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eventually spun off to become the Association of Governmental Risk Pools 
(AGRiP) in 1998.26 State insurance regulators, however, were slow to react, 
and most chose not to assert any regulatory authority over what was largely 
viewed as self-insurance.  While the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners27 eventually began an effort in 1991 to determine if model 
regulations were needed for pools, this effort was eventually abandoned.28 
While the complete history of pooling—its rise during the 1980s 
and 1990s, and the insurance industry’s coincident struggles during the 
same period—is outside the scope of this Article,29 pools continued to grow 
and take market share because insurers were unwilling or unable to fill the 
needs of increasingly exposed governmental entities.  During this period of 
tort excesses, subsequent tort reform and market instability, insurers lost a 
great deal of the commercial market insureds, including governmental 
entities, to alternative forms of risk transfer.30 Policyholders formed captive 
                                                                                                                 
Plan, PUBLIC RISK MGMT. ASS’N, http://www.primacentral.org/content.cfm? 
sectionid=9 (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
26 Nixon, supra note 20, at 2. AGRiP is a national organization and 
independent trade organization representing public entity pools. AGRiP’s vision 
statement and organizational mission is: “As the recognized authority on and 
resource for information on intergovernmental pools, AGRiP is the leading 
national association for pool management. As a result of our efforts, the pooling 
community is united to achieve excellence in pool governance, management and 
services.” What Is AGRiP?, ASS’N OF GOV’TAL RISK POOLS, 
http://www.agrip.org/whatisagrip (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).   
27 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is the U.S. standard-
setting and regulatory support organization created and governed by the chief 
insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. 
territories. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/ (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2014). While the NAIC sets standards for states to follow 
voluntarily, it has no inherent regulatory authority. However, it does have a great 
deal of influence in the insurance industry. 
28 Doucette, supra note 10, at 543 (citing the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, 
1992 Summer National Meeting, Executive Committee 10, *70–71, Lexis 1992-2 
NAIC Proc. 10).   
29 But see Doucette, supra note 10, at 543; see also Priest, supra note 15; see 
generally Nancy Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72-JUL A.B.A. J. 
48 (1986); Kenneth Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability 
Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85 (2001). These papers give a fascinating look at the 
various causes of the insurance crisis, and show how legislatures, regulators, and 
the judiciary played respective roles during this time. 
30 Abraham, supra note 29, at 99–102. 
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insurers, risk retention groups and pools to provide themselves coverage.31 
These vehicles allowed them to deal directly with the reinsurance market 
through the closely controlled pools, allowing governmental entities risk 
diversification services without the need (or cost) of conventional 
commercial general liability policies as an intermediary.32 The 
governmental entity business lost by the commercial market during these 
years never returned, as the entities learned during this insurance crisis they 
did not need to rely on the insurance market.33 Furthermore, because of the 
skyrocketing premiums,34 governmental entities came to distrust insurers; 
as a result, the alternative market of pooling increased its percentage of the 
market in the ensuing years.35 
There are approximately 91,000 distinct governmental entities 
currently operating in the United States, including counties, cities, school 
districts, townships and special districts.36 Approximately 500 pools are 
now in existence providing coverage, in some form, for approximately 
75,000 of those 91,000 governmental entities.37 Pools have differing 
administrative operations—39% of pools have their own employees, 35% 
are staffed by third party administrators of varying sizes and 26% are 
administered by association employees.38 Pool staffs are small compared 
with those of insurers: of pools with their own employees, 37% have a staff 
of five or less, 26% have more than 20 employees, 21% have 11-20 
employees, and 16% have 6-10 employees.39 Annual contributions 
(premiums) by members to their U.S. pools are estimated to be 13 to 17 
billion dollars.40 The pooling industry, while small compared to the main 
line insurers, is a substantial sector of the insurance market.41 
                                                                                                                 
31 Id. at 101–02 (citing Priest, supra note 15). 
32 Id. at 102. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 99. 
35 Id. at 102. 
36 Pumford, supra note 8 (citing 2007 U.S. Census statistics stating that the 
special districts include health and hospital districts, airport authorities, port 
authorities, and utility districts). 
37 Id.  
38 Nixon, supra note 20, at 3 (using 2009 AGRiP data). 
39 Id.  
40 Pumford, supra note 8. 
41 For a more negative view of pooling versus insurance companies or pools, 
such as the Missouri Public Entity Risk Management Fund, which operate more 
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Since laws vary throughout the United States and a survey of the 
states’ pooling laws is beyond the scope and focus of this Article, Texas 
statute and case law will be used to assist in the initial understanding of the 
legal organization and operation of pools.  Most states are similar to Texas 
in that they have little or no regulation of pools since they are not 
considered insurance carriers by statute or case law.42 For the purposes of 
this discussion, their organization is not as relevant as is the cause and 
effect of reinsurance.  But, for those unfamiliar with pooling, here are the 
basic legal constructs.  
Local governments43 that join in a common purpose44 under the 
Texas Interlocal Cooperation Act45 may self-insure against claims.46 In 
                                                                                                                 
like insurers, see generally Thomas W. Rynard, The Local Government as Insured 
or Insurer: Some New Risk Management Alternatives, 20 URB. L. REV. 103 (1988).   
42 E.g., City of S. El Monte v. So. Cal. Joint Powers Ins. Auth., 45 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 729, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). CAL. GOV’T CODE § 990.8(c) (West 2010) states 
“[t]he pooling of self-insured claims or losses among entities as authorized in 
subdivision (a) of Section 990.4 shall not be considered insurance nor be subject to 
regulation under the Insurance Code.” See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2744.081(E)(2) (West 2006) (“A joint self-insurance pool is not an insurance 
company.  Its operation does not constitute doing an insurance business and is not 
subject to the insurance laws of this state”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-
115.5(2) (West 2008) (“Any self-insurance pool authorized by subsection (1) of 
this section shall not be construed to be an insurance company nor otherwise 
subject to the provisions of the laws of this state regulating insurance or insurance 
companies . . . ”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.036(4), (5) (West 2003) (“[T]he 
Insurance Code does not apply to any of the following to the extent of subject 
matter of the exemption . . . (4) Public bodies . . . that either individually or jointly 
establish a self-insurance fund for tort liability . . . [or] (5) Public bodies . . . that 
either individually or jointly establish a self-insurance fund for property damage . . 
. ”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.4622 (West Supp. 2007) (which does not subject pools 
to the Florida Insurance Code, other than some reporting and initial capitalization 
requirements). 
43 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 791.003(4) (West 2012) (defining “local 
government”). 
44 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 791.001 (West 2012) (“The purpose of this 
chapter is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of local governments by 
authorizing them to contract, to the greatest possible extent, with one another and 
with agencies of the state.”). 
45 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 791.001–.033 (West 2012). 
46 Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds. Risk Mgmt. Fund v. Benavides Indep. Sch. Dist., 
221 S.W.3d 732, 733 (Tex. App. 2007).   
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accordance with the Interlocal Cooperation Act, Texas law permits any 
governmental unit47 to establish a self-insurance fund to protect the 
governmental unit, its officers, employees, and agents from any insurable 
risk or hazard.48 The issuance of available money for a self-insurance fund 
is deemed a public purpose of the governmental unit and such funds are not 
subject to the Texas Insurance Code and other laws of Texas relating to the 
provision or regulation of insurance.49   
Self-insurance funds themselves are not subject to the Texas 
Insurance Code pursuant to Texas case law.  In Hill v. Texas Council Risk 
Management Fund,50 the Court of Appeals held that self-insurance funds 
established by governmental units51 are exempt from the Texas Insurance 
Code.52 The plaintiff in this case brought suit against her employer’s self-
insurance fund, the Texas Council Risk Management Fund, alleging that 
uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist insurance should be 
presumed to exist in her policy because it was not rejected by her in writing 
as required by the Texas Insurance Code.53 The Texas Council Risk 
Management Fund argued that pursuant to Texas Civil Statute Article 
715c,54 because the self-insurance fund was created by money available to 
the governmental unit, the fund was not subject to the Texas Insurance 
Code or any other laws relating to the provision and regulation of 
insurance.55 The court agreed. 
The Texas Supreme Court solidified the position of pools in Ben 
Bolt-Palito Blanco Consolidated Independent School District v. Texas 
Political Subdivisions Property/Casualty Joint Self-Insurance Fund,56 in 
which the Texas Supreme Court decided the self-insurance fund was its 
own distinct governmental entity, which entitled the pool to assert 
                                                                                                                 
47 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2259.001(1) (West 2008) (defining a 
“governmental unit” as a “state agency or institution, local government, or an 
entity acting on behalf of a state agency or institution or local government.”).  
48 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2259.031(a) (West 2008). 
49 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2259.032, .037 (West 2008). 
50 20 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App. 2000). 
51 The provision cited by the Hill court has since been repealed but is 
incorporated in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. ch. 2259 (West 2008). 
52 Hill, 20 S.W.3d at 213. 
53 Cited in Hill as TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1. The statute has since been 
repealed, but is incorporated in TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1952.101 (West 2009). 
54 Supra note 51. 
55 Hill, 20 S.W.3d at 212–13. 
56 212 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. 2006). 
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immunity in its own right and enjoy the same immunities as the political 
subdivisions that comprised the pool.57 However, even pools waive this 
immunity when entering into written contractual agreements, such as 
contracts for coverage with their own members.58 
Essentially, the legal process works as follows: two or more 
governmental entities decide to share risk, sign an interlocal agreement 
stating so, form the pool, fund the pool, and hire personnel to handle the 
administration of the pool. 
 
B.   OVERVIEW OF REINSURANCE CONCEPTS 
 
Generally, reinsurance operates identically with pools as it does 
with insurers.  Pools, like insurance carriers, obtain reinsurance for those 
exposures that are too great to retain.  Reinsurance may be defined as a 
contractual arrangement under which one insurer, known as the primary 
insurer, transfers to another insurer, known as the reinsurer, some or all of 
the losses insured by the primary insurer under insurance contracts it has 
issued or will issue in the future.59 The primary insurer is sometimes 
referred to as the ceding insurer, ceding entity, cedent, or reinsured.  For 
consistency, the term cedent (or pool) and reinsurer will be used when 
referring to reinsurance situations.  
In most cases, the reinsurer does not assume all of the liability of 
the cedent pool.  The reinsurance agreement usually requires the cedent to 
keep a portion of the liability.  This is known as the cedent’s retention, and 
may be expressed as a dollar amount, a percentage of the original amount 
of insurance, or a combination of the two.  There is usually an upper limit 
to the reinsurer’s limit of liability.60  
The primary functions of reinsurance are: stabilization of the 
cedent’s long-term loss experience; giving the cedent large line capacity; 
cedent financing; cedent catastrophe protection; underwriting assistance; 
and, allowing the cedent to retire from a territory or class of business.61 
Discussing the primary functions of reinsurance in order: 
                                                                                                                 
57 Id. at 325–26. 
58 See id.; see also TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.152 (West 2005). 
59 2 BERNARD L. WEBB ET AL., INSURANCE OPERATIONS 1 (2d ed. 1997).  
60 Id. at 1–2. 
61 Id. at 2. Retirement from a territory or class of business is generally not 
relevant to pooling and will not be discussed here. 
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Stabilization of loss experience—A pool must have a consistent 
positive underwriting experience in order to increase its capital and surplus 
to support growth and stability of the pool.  Because losses can fluctuate, 
sometimes widely, a major function of reinsurance is to lessen the impact 
of large losses through controlled spending of reinsurance premiums.62   
Large line capacity—There are two kinds of capacity in the 
property and casualty world—large line capacity and premium capacity.  
Large line refers to a cedent’s ability to provide a high limit of insurance on 
a single loss exposure.  A cedent may write a large line by keeping its 
retention within a reasonable relationship to its capital and surplus and 
reinsuring the balance.  A competitive market environment creates the need 
for reinsurance;63 without reinsurance, a carrier could not market to larger 
exposures, ceding the available market to larger carriers. 
Financing—The second kind of capacity is premium capacity, 
which refers to the aggregate premium volume a pool can write.  The 
common measure of capacity is expressed in terms of contribution-to-
surplus ratio.  This is because there is a limit to the amount of contributions 
a pool can write.  The limit for any pool is a function of the carrier’s 
surplus.64 A pool is likely to be considered overextended if its net written 
contributions, after deduction of contributions on reinsurance ceded, 
exceeds its surplus by a ratio of more than three to one.65 
Catastrophe Protection—Property and casualty insurers (and to a 
lesser extent, workers’ compensation insurers), are subject to catastrophic 
losses that may result in millions of dollars of claims to a single pool.  The 
purpose of reinsurance is generally related to the purpose of stabilizing loss 
experience, as catastrophes are major causes of the instability.66 
Underwriting Assistance—Reinsurers deal with a wide variety and 
a large number of carriers.  As a result, they accumulate a great deal of 
information regarding the experience of various cedents in certain markets.  
                                                                                                                 
62 Id. at 2–3. 
63 Id. at 4. 
64 Surplus is defined as the amount by which assets exceed liabilities. Int’l 
Risk Mgmt. Inst., Inc., Surplus, IRMI RISK MGMT. & INS. EDUC. & INFO., 
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/s/surplus.aspx. (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2014). 
65 WEBB ET AL., supra note 59, at 4. 
66 Id. at 7. 
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This experience can be helpful to pools, particularly to smaller pools or 
carriers planning on entering new and unfamiliar markets.67  
As can be seen above, reinsurers have far-ranging functions and 
benefits in the marketplace. 
As to the types of reinsurance, there are two basic forms: treaty 
reinsurance and facultative reinsurance.68 Facultative reinsurance is 
purchased for a specific risk insured by a cedent, such as a particular piece 
of machinery.69 Treaty reinsurance, the most commonly used reinsurance in 
pooling, is an agreement that binds the cedent to cede a specific portion of 
the risk of an entire class of business, such as all property coverage written 
by the cedents, to a reinsurer.  Through one contract, the treaty reinsurer is 
required to cover a cedent on an entire book of business, even on business 
yet unwritten by the cedent.70   
There are two main duties in the reinsurance relationship with 
cedents that are relevant to our discussion.  The first is a common law duty 
of “utmost good faith”71 between the parties.72 This is defined as the “most 
abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; 
the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight.”73 This 
common law duty of utmost good faith was viewed as necessary for the 
very foundation of reinsurance: 
 
Historically, the reinsurance market has 
relied on a practice of the exercise of 
utmost good faith to decrease monitoring 
costs and ex ante contracting costs.  
Reinsurance works only if the sums of the 
reinsurance premiums are less than the 
original insurance premium.  Otherwise, 
the ceding insurers will not reinsure.  For 
the reinsurance premium to be less, 
                                                                                                                 
67 Id. at 7–8. 
68 There are many sub-types of reinsurance: facultative obligatory and 
automatic facultative, among others. Id. at 10–11. 
69 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, MODERN REINSURANCE 
LAW AND PRACTICE 2-5 to 2-7 (2d ed. 2000). 
70 Id. at 2-4 to 2-5; see also WEBB ET AL., supra note 59, at 10. 
71 In Latin, uberrima fides. 
72 OSTRAGER &VYSKOCIL, supra note 69, at 3-4 to 3-6. 
73 Id. at 3-4 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1520 (6th ed. 1990)).   
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reinsurers cannot duplicate the costly but 
necessary efforts of the primary insurer in 
evaluating risks and handling claims . . . 
[t]hey are protected, however, by a large 
area of common interest with ceding 
insurers and by the tradition of utmost 
good faith, particularly in the sharing of 
information.74 
 
Because of the nature of reinsurance, the cedent’s duty to the 
reinsurer to disclose information is very broad.  The duty of utmost good 
faith also extends to all of a cedent’s business activities, including 
underwriting and claims handling.75 However, case law makes it very clear 
this duty of utmost good faith is a reciprocal one, owed by both cedents and 
their reinsurers.76 Reinsurers must appropriately investigate and pay 
cedent’s claims. 
The second main duty in this reinsurance relationship is the 
“follow the fortunes” doctrine.  Similar in concept to utmost good faith, 
this doctrine requires the reinsurer to follow the cedent’s underwriting 
fortunes.  In other words, if the pool suffers an underwriting loss due to a 
large claim, the reinsurer has the duty to suffer a loss by the agreement 
terms as well, restricting the reinsurer from questioning the validity of 
cedents’ good faith claim payments.  Under this doctrine, reinsurers must 
indemnify cedents for reasonable settlements and judgments.77 The 
reinsurer is required to indemnify the cedent for reasonable payments made 
within the terms of the original agreement with their insured (or member, 
                                                                                                                 
74 Id. at 3-5 (citing Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 
1054 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
75 Id. at 3-19 (citing Am. Marine Ins. Grp. v. Neptunia Ins. Co., 775 F. Supp. 
703, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing that a 
ceding insurer satisfies its duty when it acts “honestly and . . . [with] all proper and 
businesslike steps”)). 
76 Id. at 3-6 (citing Compagnie de Reassurance d’Ile de France v. New Eng. 
Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 56, 88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1009 (1995); 
United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 53 F. Supp. 2d 632, 642 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The duty of utmost good faith is a mutual one; it is an 
obligation of the reinsurer as well as the cedent.”)). 
77 Id. at 9-3 (citing Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne Reinsurance 
Co., 552 N.E. 2d 139, 140 (1990)). 
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for pools), even if the claim is technically not covered by it.78 One purpose 
of the follow the fortunes doctrine is to allow reinsurers to avoid the 
unnecessary expense, delay and risk that would result from duplicative 
claims handling, and instead rely on the cedent’s honesty and competence 
in adjusting claims.79 The doctrine also promotes settlements since, without 
the doctrine, cedents would have to litigate every coverage dispute with its 
insured or member, or obtain consent from reinsurers to settle on every file.  
Additionally, reinsurers seeking to deny coverage would then use defenses 
that the cedents might raise against their insureds or members in coverage 
disputes.  The same coverage dispute would be re-litigated repeatedly 
upward along the risk transfer chain.80 
The doctrines of utmost good faith and follow the fortunes are 
distinguished from other reinsurance topics because, since the mid-1990’s, 
these doctrines appear to be the aspects of the reinsurance framework that 
received the most scrutiny.  As profit margins of the era diminished, and 
catastrophic claims grew, the acceptance of the historical ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ regarding reinsurance seemed to be in peril.81 The push by both 
cedent and reinsurer was towards arms-length and sophisticated 
transactions, instead of relying on treaty certificates of only a few pages, 
                                                                                                                 
78 Id. at 9-5 (citing Christiana Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F. 2d 
268, 280 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
79 Id. at 9-11 (citing Ins. Co. of the State of PA v. Grand Union Ins. Co., 
[1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 208, 210 (C.A.)). 
80 Id. at 9-12 (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F. 3d 
1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1995)). Reinsurers sometimes have their own reinsurers, 
known as retrocessionaires. Retrocessionaire, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK & 
INSURANCE, http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/r/retrocession 
aire.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). Such retrocessionaires would add to the 
coverage litigation complexity were it not for the ‘follow the fortunes’ doctrine.  
81 See generally Steven W. Thomas, Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance: A 
Tradition in Need of Adjustment, 41 DUKE L.J. 1548 (1992). Thomas emphasized 
environmental claims, which are not usually involved with governmental entities, 
but also felt large catastrophic claims were a culprit in this distancing of the 
cedent-reinsurer relationship. It is the author’s experience that governmental pools 
have large exposures as well, usually in the form of property with weather related 
exposures, such as hail or tornadoes. 
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and a degree of faith.  The trust factor was diminishing and courts were 
playing a part in dismantling the doctrines,82 thus bringing us to the present. 
 
C.   INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 
 
Analysis of the governance role of insurance starts with the basic 
argument raised by Insurance as Governance,83 in which the authors 
explored their theory that the insurance industry has a great societal impact, 
largely invisible and freely accepted, that functions as a form of 
government beyond the state.  The authors examine, first, how the 
insurance industry is one of the most pervasive and powerful institutions in 
society, and, second, despite acting in the background, how insurance 
governs our lives. 
Insurance as Governance analyzes how society consumes 
insurance products, becomes part of the product, and how insurers then 
govern through the maintenance of risk pools of insureds that are large 
enough to ensure losses are reasonably predictable, thus subject to 
governance.  It points to the economic, social, legal, cultural and political 
dimensions of insurance as governance, and to the significance of insurance 
for political sociology.  The authors describe insurance as “moral 
technology,” defining how people should act, and finds that insurance as 
governance focuses on a form of private regulation of moral risks, all of 
which are subject to classification and segmentation by insurers.   
While a fascinating work regarding insurers as a governance force 
in society, Insurance as Governance did not examine the insurer of 
insurers, the reinsurers, and how reinsurers’ influence in the marketplace 
might take the form of governance over insurers, and thus society.  While 
the authors described the reinsurer relationship as one of suspicion, and the 
reinsurance process as being fraught with moral risk judgments and 
implications,84 they did not address the relationship aspect further as to the 
governance potential of reinsurance.   
However, Professor Aviva Abramovsky’s article, Reinsurance: the 
Silent Regulator?, opened the discussion as to the potential for reinsurer 
                                                                                                                 
82 OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 69, at 3-24 (citing Franklin D. 
Marsteller, Uberrima Fides: Reinsurers Take Aim at Lack of Good Faith, 8 L. DIG. 
24 (1988). 
83 See generally RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 
(2003).  
84 Id. at 114–25, 365. 
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governance.  She posited that insurers themselves might be silently 
regulated, apart from state regulation, by the influence of reinsurers whose 
product is necessary to those insurers.  Her conclusion was that 
reinsurance, through private contract, had the capacity to certainly 
influence, if not directly regulate, insurer behavior.  This influence, 
Professor Abramovsky felt, took forms such as affecting insurer 
underwriting and claim handling, as well as the potential for reinsurers to 
support rather than prohibit unfair insurer practices through the moral 
hazard of reinsuring tortious activity.85 Because of this ability, she opined, 
reinsurance influence capacity should be a part of regulatory discussions of 
the insurance industry as a whole.86 While Professor Abramovsky 
demonstrated in detail the potential capacity for reinsurer regulatory 
influence and many aspects under which it might arise, her research did not 
delve into what was actually happening on the ground with carriers and 
their staff.  Were insurers actually influenced by the reinsurer relationship, 
and if so, to what extent?  What did their experience reflect?  Field research 
would be necessary for a fuller understanding of this reinsurer influence 
concept. 
Based on research conducted for this Article, a clear conclusion 
can be reached that pools, while not regulated per se by reinsurers, are 
substantively influenced in their operations by reinsurers’ specific requests, 
whether pre- or post-engagement.  These reinsurers’ requests, with consent 
by the pools, create a form of governance voluntarily accepted by the 
pools.  Through varying parameters set forth by reinsurers, pools can 
individually decide to what degree they wish to have their operations 
governed.  Because of the necessity of reinsurance for some pools, they 
agree to more oversight; because of the financial strength of other pools, 
they are able to insist on less governance, or none at all through complete 
self-insurance.  Some pools feel the influence greatly in both underwriting 
and claims, some in one area or the other, and some only indirectly or 
generally.  Nevertheless, while reinsurance governance varies from pool to 
pool, and is voluntarily accepted, this research shows that it exists.  
This research also indicates, because of these close relationships, 
that governmental risk pools are a corner of the market where the 
reinsurance concept of “utmost good faith” still appears to thrive.  At least 
in pooling, utmost good faith is a vital part of the reinsurer-cedent process, 
                                                                                                                 
85 Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 385–401. 
86 Id. at 405. 
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and is only growing more necessary for the profitability of the reinsurers, 
and the operating efficiency of many pools.   
Additionally, pools are accommodating to reinsurer’s input, 
although the accommodation levels vary; and several factors affect the 
level of reinsurer influence, most notably the financial solvency of the pool.  
Both of these results tie back into the utmost good faith and the voluntary 
acceptance of the reinsurers’ form of governance mentioned above.    
No doubt, some readers may disagree with this interpretation of the 
evidence, and some survey participants may differ regarding the 
characterization of their comments.  This may arise from the general vision, 
for good or ill, of ‘governance’ or ‘regulation’ as linked with state power, 
often in a negative fashion.87 Additionally, while this research cannot be 
directly extrapolated to main-line insurers or even give a complete and 
comprehensive view of the pooling world, it constitutes a waypoint for 
future research and discussion.  
 
III.  RESEARCH SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
 
Because of the author’s current professional position,88 the focus of 
the research was on one small corner of the insurance and risk management 
world, the governmental entity self-insured risk management pools, as a 
case study.  Limiting the discussion to this segment of the market allowed 
an examination of a more pure reinsurer-cedent environment.  Rather than 
research with insurers that already felt the effects of state regulators, there 
was an opportunity to interview carriers that had little or no state 
regulation.  While interviewing insurers would be broader research, it 
                                                                                                                 
87 Id. at 346 (“Yet such a restrictive vision of regulation is simplistic and 
ignores the capacity of private institutions to regulate the activities of large swaths 
of social actors.”). 
88 The author is currently Assistant Director, Legal and Regulatory Affairs, for 
the Texas Association of School Boards, Inc., the third party administrator for the 
TASB Risk Management Fund, an administrative agency of cooperating local 
governments. The Fund, based in Austin, Texas, is a self-insured governmental 
entity risk management pool providing coverage for approximately 1100 school 
districts, junior colleges, and related educational entities throughout Texas. The 
Fund is the result of separate funds merging in 1997 to put all lines of coverage 
under one entity. TASB, Inc., the administrator to the Fund, currently has 450 
employees, of which 176 are solely assigned to the administration of the Fund.  
The Fund has total assets of $333,764,377 and a members’ equity of $227,923,874 
(as of August 31, 2013). Documents on file with TASB, Inc. 
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would be more difficult to disentangle the state regulator influence from the 
initial discussion. 
For this research, four pooling industry sources provided 
suggestions for potential survey participants.  These sources eventually 
became interviewees themselves.89 The author knew three of the 
interviewees professionally prior to the survey.  Because of the necessity 
for introductions to the rest of the survey group, the survey was not 
conducted in a purely random manner.90 While this ‘referral’ method 
increased the response rate to nearly 100%, the survey lacked a randomness 
factor and perhaps the size needed for a more scientific survey.  However, 
this referral survey method may have led to greater candor and willingness 
for detailed responses, even more so for one interviewee whom had 
recently retired.91   
Thirteen senior officials with pools from across the country 
responded to the survey.  Their responses were unique to their own pool or 
experiences; some pools only have one or two lines of coverage, some join 
with other pools for certain lines of coverage, and some offer all lines of 
coverage for their members.  The pools are distributed geographically 
across the United States: two pools located in the Midwest, three in the 
South, three in the East, and five in the West.  Additionally, two senior 
officials, one current and one former, with the Association of 
Governmental Risk Pools (AGRiP), also responded, as well as a reinsurer 
underwriter.  The two AGRiP officials, having interacted with leaders of 
over 200 member pools across the country, were probably in the best 
position to see broad trends, as was the reinsurer underwriter.92 However, 
the pooling officials were in the best current position for opining on direct 
reinsurer effects. 
                                                                                                                 
89 This is both fortunate, because of their immense experience, and 
unfortunate, as they cannot be publicly thanked due to the ethical format rules of 
publishing survey research. However, they know who they are. The author wishes 
to thank them all for their guidance through the world of pooling. 
90 Had the survey been completely random, rather than by referral, the 
response rate would have likely been greatly reduced. Only one person did not 
respond. Industry officials, on the author’s behalf, contacted several other potential 
participants, with no response. This number is unknown, but estimated to be less 
than ten. 
91 Additionally, one other participant was an active official during the survey 
and retired prior to the completion of this paper. 
92 No other reinsurer representative was willing to participate. 
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The survey interview was in a written format via email; although 
one was a telephone interview with follow up confirming emails as to 
content.93 The interview was semi-structured in nature, in that interviews 
began with the same general questions to all pooling official participants, 
but follow-up questions were individualized based on the types and forms 
of responses.94 The survey questions were altered for the AGRiP officials 
and the reinsurer underwriter because of their more industry-wide view.95 
Three appendices of the initial research survey questions are attached.  The 
responses were free form, which resulted in additional contact with most of 
the survey participants for the purpose of follow-up questions or 
clarifications.  Because of this, the survey results acquired a “snowball” 
effect, gathering information down the winter path, injecting some degree 
of randomness along the way.  Many interviewees took their own course as 
to the responses, and did not stay with the original question format.  The 
responses tended to be conversational in nature; while making it more 
difficult to place in context for this Article, the result was beneficial to this 
research. 
 
IV.  SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Having explored the history and legal constructs of pooling, 
reviewed the purpose of reinsurance, examined the concept of insurance 
                                                                                                                 
93 The telephone interview was simply a preference by the participant; he later 
approved his quotes via email. The initial questions were identical. 
94 In retrospect, with the conclusion in hand, there may have been more 
effective initial and follow up questions (e.g., infra note 164). Hindsight is a 
wonderful teacher.  
95 All of the individuals responding gave the author permission to quote them 
verbatim, although some minor corrections for any typographical errors and for 
clarity in the context of this Article were made. The author sincerely thanks all of 
the respondents for making this Article possible through their extremely generous 
contributions of time, as well as their patience, with the author’s inquiries. Their 
assistance was invaluable. The original e-mails are on file with the author. Because 
some respondents had no opinion on a particular matter, or lacked experience in a 
particular area, not every respondent answered every question. The survey 
participants also demonstrated a willingness of several of the participants to share 
specific underwriting information, which may seem unusual in this proprietary age.  
However, this is because the pools themselves are public entities using public 
funds, and as such, their records are open; e.g., the Texas Public Information Act, 
TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. §§ 552.001 et seq. (West 2012).  
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and reinsurance as governance, and outlined the survey mechanics, we 
arrive at the focus of this paper:  to what extent does reinsurance have a 
governance effect on insurers?    
Four distinct discussion areas arose in the survey interviews:96 
 
 How reinsurers influence pools—underwriting, claims, 
finance/solvency, and generally; 
 The duty of utmost good faith and its effect; 
 To what level pools afford accommodation to 
reinsurers; and 
 Whether reinsurer influence varies based on pool 
circumstances, or external factors. 
 
Because of the overlapping nature of some of the answers, many of 
the responses could apply to several subject matter units and it was often 
difficult to extricate the comments into singular areas.  Therefore, some 
comments, based on the correlative relationship subject matter, may easily 
apply to several topics.  At some point, interviewees’ opinions had to find a 
home, although some may disagree as to their placement.  So, we begin. 
 
A.  HOW REINSURERS INFLUENCE POOLS 
 
The initial question to the pooling senior officials was 
straightforward—do you think pools are influenced by reinsurers, and if so, 
how?  The term ‘regulated’ was not mentioned to the pooling senior 
officials due to the concern that the term would be interpreted too 
restrictively and compared directly to state regulation, which pooling 
officials tend to view as their kryptonite.97 For initial inquiries directed to 
                                                                                                                 
96 The four areas materialized through the form of the question, or in the 
manner in which the interviewees responded.   
97 It has been the author’s experience that this general attitude has little to do 
with specific concerns about regulatory oversight, or apprehension regarding 
irradiated fragments from exploded planets. It has to do more with the greater 
ability to be competitive in the marketplace and serve their members more 
efficiently and with flexibility. As discussed in the pooling background section, 
pools are extremely transparent in their operations due to their public nature, much 
more so than private insurers. Because their executive boards are filled with 
representatives of their own members, it is felt they will ‘do the right thing’ on 
their members’ behalf without burdensome, and expensive, regulatory oversight. 
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the AGRiP officials and the reinsurance underwriter, the term ‘regulated’ 
was used, since it was felt they could more easily discern the true intent of 
the question based on their broader experiences.  The overall responses 
generally reflected that yes, pools are influenced by reinsurers, as 
suspected.  But, how are they influenced, and to what extent?  The 
influence appears to be to the point of reinsurer governance, although 
freely accepted by the carriers.  However, this is only part of the story.  The 
initial responses are broken down into four key areas of influence: 




The survey participants emphasized underwriting as a main area 
where reinsurers had the most influence and this is where the most specific 
examples arose.  In other areas, examples tended to be less definitive and 
more conjectural.  This is likely because, by its nature, underwriting is 
more of a science, unlike claim operations, which tend more towards an art 
form.   
A senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property 
and Casualty, Inc.,98 discussed underwriting influence due to the necessity 
of reinsurance and pricing as being key factors.  She indicated: 
 
The impact upon the pricing and availability of reinsurance 
. . . is on my mind, influencing each and every decision 
that I make . . . [s]ince approximately [one-third] of 
members’ annual contributions pay for ceded coverage at 
our pool, it is vitally important to keep the cost down, to 
the extent that we can.  While I am fairly new to pooling, I 
learned the impact that a major loss can have on 
                                                                                                                 
As a senior official with the Texas Association of School Boards, Inc., stated when 
asked about this issue: “Most pools are outgrowths of their membership and 
therefore have always thought of themselves as governmental in nature, rather than 
insurance-like. I think the notion that a governmental self-insurance entity would 
be subject to insurance regulation just didn’t make sense . . . Pools do NOT 
consider themselves insurance companies, so to be regulated like one would be 
really anathema to them.” E-mail from senior official, Texas Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 
Inc. to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (the author) (Mar. 23, 2013, 8:26 PM CST) (on 
file with author). 
98 The Missouri Housing Authorities Property & Casualty, Inc., website is 
available at http://www.mhapci.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
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reinsurance premium early in my career [as a senior 
official].  In May, 2011, one of our [m]embers suffered a 
catastrophic loss of life and property.99 The total incurred 
loss [for our pool] exceeded $8,000,000. 
   
When we went out into the reinsurance market for the 
ensuing policy year, the reinsurance cost increased by 
43%, due in part to a 32% increase in the total insured 
value of our properties, which also resulted from a 
reinsurance-influenced decision.  Following this loss and a 
couple of other big losses that followed closely on its 
heels, we learned that on the whole, our members’ 
replacement cost property estimates and property insurance 
limits were low and that in many cases member properties 
were inadequately covered.  Not only did we notice this, 
but the issue must also have come to the attention of our 
reinsurers who, for perhaps the first time in our history, 
established a margin clause100 of 100%.  In other words, in 
the event of a loss, the reinsurer would not pay any more 
than the estimated replacement cost.  Following the 2012 
reinsurance placement cycle, I went to the Board with a 
recommendation that the Board hire an insurance valuation 
company to measure unique buildings and secure a 
replacement cost valuation for each and every building that 
the pool covers.  This decision resulted in our ability to 
negotiate a 130% margin clause for 2013 coverage, as the 
reinsurers were more confident that they were collecting 
the right amount of premium. 
 
                                                                                                                 
99 See Joplin Tornado Event Summary, NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE, 
http://www.crh.noaa.gov/sgf/?n=event_2011may22_summary (last visited Dec. 27, 
2014). 
100 A margin clause is defined as, “[a] nonstandard commercial property 
insurance provision stating that the most the insured can collect for a loss at a 
given location is a specified percentage of the values reported for that location on 
the insured's statement of values.” Margin Clause, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK 
AND INS., http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/m/margin-
clause.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
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Another example of the reinsurer influence occurred 
around 2005.  My predecessor was informed that blanket 
coverage would no longer be available and was provided a 
timetable to convert to property scheduling by individual 
building in order for continued availability of reinsurance 
by long-standing reinsurance partners.  The pool had to go 
out to the membership and get a listing with square footage 
and values for each and every building.  This was a time-
consuming, expensive and controversial proposition that 
was accomplished to ensure availability of reinsurance.  
[However,] I have not received any reinsurer . . . 
suggestions [as to] what coverages to offer or underwriting 
criterion.101 
  
This senior official’s experience shows the availability of 
reinsurance was in danger without substantial action by the pool, which 
shows a great deal of underwriting influence by a reinsurer.  As this official 
indicated, every decision is influenced by the pricing and availability of 
reinsurance.  Since the pool was willing to do what was necessary to show 
utmost good faith and transparency in underwriting, the reinsurer also felt 
confidence in the pool’s leadership and agreed to favorable terms moving 
forward.  But their reinsurer focused on the exposure, rather than the 
individual coverages, so that evidences a belief that, if the base information 
could be corrected, an agreement could be reached that was beneficial for 
both. 
Similarly, a senior official with the Texas Association of School 
Boards, Inc.,102 also discussed direct influence from reinsurers, specifically 
regarding underwriting of property and workers’ compensation coverages, 
but mentioning other areas in general: 
 
I do think [pools] are greatly influenced . . . by their 
reinsurers’ wishes.  That is particularly true for those pools 
that have very low retentions and therefore pass off most of 
the risk to their reinsurers.  In those instances, claims 
                                                                                                                 
101 E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous. Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to  
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (June 13, 2013, 3:00 PM CST) (on file with author). 
102 This organization’s website, as the third party administrator for the TASB 
Risk Management Fund, can be found at http://www.tasbrmf.org/ (last visited Dec. 
27, 2014). 
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handling, exposure collection, financial matters, even 
underwriting criteria can be dictated by the reinsurer.  Even 
with our very high retentions, we experience this from time 
to time.  For example, after [hurricanes] Katrina, Rita and 
Wilma hit [the Gulf Coast],103 the reinsurance community 
became very concerned about the quality of construction of 
the buildings they were reinsuring.  They imposed 
significantly more detailed reporting requirements on the 
types of structures we were covering, what they were built 
out of, how old they were, etc.  Where before we were able 
to just include the address and a general description of our 
buildings on the schedule of values we submitted to the 
reinsurers, all of a sudden we were required to obtain very 
specific COPE104 information on every building.  That 
required us to significantly change the way we collect and 
maintain our exposure information. 
 
The second example is the requirement by our [workers’ 
compensation] reinsurer to start providing information on 
the concentration of risk—the number of employees at any 
one location.  That change was implemented after the 
Joplin tornado and the Alabama tornadoes hit a couple of 
years ago.  Workers’ compensation reinsurers realized that 
                                                                                                                 
103 See generally Hurricanes in History, NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE, 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
104 COPE is “an acronym that stands for the four property risk characteristics 
an underwriter reviews when evaluating a submission for property insurance: 
Construction (e.g., frame, masonry, masonry veneer, superior construction, 
mixed—masonry/frame); Occupancy (how the building is being used for 
commercial property and whether it is owner-occupant or renter-occupied for 
homeowners and the number of families for which the building is designed); 
Protection (e.g., quality of the responding fire department including whether it is 
paid or volunteer, adequacy of water pressure and water supply in the community, 
distance of the structure to the nearest fire station, quality of the fire hydrant, and 
the distance of the structure to the nearest hydrant); and Exposure (risks of loss 
posed by neighboring property or the surrounding area, taking into consideration 
what is located near the property, such as an office building, a subdivision, or a 
fireworks factory).” COPE, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK AND INS., 
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/c/cope.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2014). 
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they may not have accurate information on the number of 
total people exposed to a devastating event, especially if 
they write several large employers in a single 
community.  So now, we are providing information by 
location and address of the number of employees working 
at each location.105 
 
While her examples mention underwriting influence in both 
workers’ compensation and property, she does feel there is a broader 
influence, including claims and finances.  The examples the official gave 
were both exposure oriented.  Note the reinsurers insisted on detailed 
information, which they had not previously required, a new parameter for 
the relationship. It was provided willingly by the pool, since the 
relationship was more valuable than the expense or trouble to obtain the 
information.  In exchange, the pool retained the necessary reinsurance 
coverage. 
A senior official with the County Commissioners Association of 
Pennsylvania,106 emphasized underwriting influence, noting: 
 
We do have lots of discussion [with our reinsurer] about 
coverage issues and underwriting.  A recent example was 
the conversion of the entire Equipment Breakdown (Boiler 
and Machinery) section of our Coverage Document, which 
was outdated and was based on wording provided by a 
prior [re]insurer.  Our current reinsurer assisted us with 
wording to match their reinsurance coverage, and reviewed 
the results before we sent the Coverage Document to the 
membership . . . [we] have our own Coverage Document 
and we review the changes we would like to make in the 
document with them.  They are trusted advisors.107 
 
                                                                                                                 
105 E-mail from senior official, TASB, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (May 
8, 2013, 10:05 AM CST) (on file with author). 
106 The County Commissioners Association of Pennsylvania website is 
available at http://www.pacounties.org/Insurance/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 27, 2014). 
107 E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc. (June 13, 2013, 8:50 AM CST) (on file with author). 
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This official focused on the coverages, and worked with the 
reinsurer to verify that the reinsurer could use their coverage agreement to 
follow the carrier’s fortunes accurately.  The pool accepts their input, even 
to the point of considering the reinsurer a business advisor.  This appears to 
be an accepted form of governance as to this pool. 
A senior official with the Park District Risk Management 
Agency108 indicates underwriting influence as well.  Additionally, he makes 
a specific point that underlies many of the responses—that reinsurer 
influence occurs over a period of years in the relationship, rather than 
reinsurers making specific demands.  He notes: 
 
For PDRMA, the influence of reinsurers has accumulated 
over time as opposed to a specific reinsurer telling us that 
we needed to do certain things in order to procure 
reinsurance coverage.  For example, we have refined the 
data we collect from our members over the years in order 
to have the ‘right’ data so that an underwriter can 
understand our exposures and properly price them.  That 
‘right’ data varies from reinsurer to reinsurer and can also 
vary with market cycles, i.e. hard109 versus soft market.110 
 
This points to the same focus as felt by the Missouri pool, although 
it happened over a number of years.  The reinsurer used their influence to 
get the carrier to obtain the ‘right’ (by that reinsurer’s standards) data.  This 
official also mentions that the data collected can vary by reinsurer or 
market conditions—regardless, the reinsurer is affecting the pool (by 
dictating what data is collected), which complies in order to obtain the 
product. 
                                                                                                                 
108 The Park District Risk Management Agency website is available at 
https://www.pdrma.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
109 A hard market is one side of the insurance market cycle that is 
characterized by high rates, low limits, and restricted coverage. Hard Market, 
INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK AND INS., http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-
glossary/terms/h/hard-market.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
110 A soft market is one side of the insurance market cycle that is characterized 
by low rates, high limits, flexible contracts, and the high availability of coverage. 
INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., RISK AND INS.: Soft Market, 
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/s/soft-market.aspx (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2014); E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency, 
to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (July 6, 2013, 1:38 PM CST) (on file with author). 
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Other pooling executives felt there was less underwriting influence 
by reinsurers.  A senior official at Ashton Tiffany, LLC, the third party 
administrator for the Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc.,111 
mentions the interaction and exchange regarding underwriting.  He 
indicated: 
 
It depends on the maturity of the pool and the experience 
level of the pool staff, but we have a balanced scale of give 
and take with our reinsurers.  The . . . Trust is a mature 
property and casualty pool with over twenty years’ 
experience . . . negotiating with reinsurers. 
 
The Trust has our own coverage agreements which are 
reviewed and adjusted each year based on our claims 
experience and evolving case law.  We forward the draft 
revised coverage agreement to our lead reinsurance 
partners and ask for their feedback.  Although we do not 
always incorporate their suggestions, we appreciate and 
value their feedback.  We believe this provides multiple 
viewpoints on coverage and also creates a solid working 
relationship with our [reinsurers].  We also ask for their 
feedback with emerging issues coming from the reinsurers’ 
book of business other than our account specifically.  This 
helps us to be proactive with coverage issues for our 
members instead of being reactive . . .  
 
As a mature pool, our reinsurers typically do not try to 
influence us on our underwriting decisions.  The only 
influence our reinsurance carriers have on underwriting 
procedures is if certain exclusions are adopted into the 
agreement with the Trust.  Recently, we had this very 
situation arise regarding high-level ropes courses offered 
by some of our members.  One reinsurer wanted to exclude 
coverage for all ropes courses.  We stood firm and 
reasoned with them that it would require additional time to 
remove the exposure and, if not removing the exposures, 
we would provide extensive loss control measures to 
                                                                                                                 
111 The Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, Inc., website is available at 
https://www.svc.the-trust.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
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reduce the exposure.  The agreement resulted in the 
reinsurer dropping their proposed exclusion.112 
 
While this official felt there was minimal influence, he also noted 
the depth of the relationship necessary to get to that point.  It is unlikely a 
new reinsurer of the Trust would be willing to cede all influence until they 
were comfortable with the Trust’s operation.  Additionally, while he feels 
influence is minimal, it does not appear so.  He mentions a fair amount of 
ongoing interaction between his staff and the reinsurer, as well as the value 
of their feedback.  Feedback that is valued and sought seems to indicate a 
greater influence than a simple commodity transaction.  Note how the 
relationship is always there, affecting every transaction.  While this official 
might not characterize it as such, this level of interaction appears to be 
reinsurer governance. 
A senior official with the Maryland Association of Boards of 
Education113 felt there was less influence in his operation as well.  He 
notes: 
 
Our pools are influenced somewhat by reinsurers . . . Our 
Pool [School Board Legal] coverage is a manuscript 
policy.  When we first went to this reinsurer they ‘blessed’ 
the policy with a couple of minor changes we were fine 
with and we just handle our claims . . .   The only influence 
was on our School Board Legal policy whereas the 
reinsurer came on the risk they indicated they would not 
reinsure an exposure we covered, so we changed our policy 
to be in conformance with what they wanted.  It was 
actually a small matter which has not caused any specific 
issues.114  
 
While not initially noting influence, it appears that their policies 
are reviewed by reinsurers to make sure the reinsurer wishes to follow this 
                                                                                                                 
112 E-mail from senior official, Ashton Tiffany, LLC, to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc. (June 24, 2013, 10:19 PM CST) (on file with author). 
113 The Maryland Association of Boards of Education website is available at 
http://www.mabe.org/insurance-programs/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
114 E-mails from, senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc. (June 14, 2013, 1:37 PM CST, 2:31 PM CST) (on file with author).  
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pool’s fortune.  As we will see later, this is not the last word from this 
official about the importance of the relationship.  
A senior official from the Idaho Counties Risk Management 
Program115 felt there was little influence.  He stated: 
 
Our experience at ICRMP and in my discussion with peers, 
regarding reinsurance relationships, leaves me with the 
impression reinsurers do not influence pools directly.  We 
have not had specific requests to amend coverage . . . or 
otherwise alter our pool operations to fit reinsurer’s needs.  
Certainly there is underwriting exposure data that must be 
provided such as payroll, property values, and other basic 
underwriting info and claims must be reported to 
reinsurers, however, ground level operations are left up to 
the pool.116 
 
While this official felt there was no influence on pools directly, he 
did not say there was none at all.  He notes the underwriting data “that must 
be provided” and considers it ordinary.  Nevertheless, these seem to be 
similar requests made of other pools (perhaps not as detailed) and those 
officials felt they were influenced by such requests.  While this official may 
feel no direct influence outside the expected underwriting issues, it appears 
those very underwriting influences form the core of the influence.  If the 
underwriting information were no longer transmitted as required, it appears 
from these comments that reinsurance would no longer be offered.  This 
seems like voluntary governance—if this data is not provided, the 
reinsurance product will cease to be available, or certainly more costly. 
A senior official with the Alabama Trust for Boards of 
Education117 self-funded pool mentioned underwriting, stating: 
 
My observations have been that reinsurers influence pool 
formation and operations in areas of financial management, 
underwriting, and claims management.  [Reinsurers] are . . 
                                                                                                                 
115 The Idaho Counties Risk Management Program website is available at 
http://www.icrmp.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
116 E-mail from senior official, Idaho Cntys. Risk Mgmt. Program, to Assistant 
Dir., TASB, Inc. (June 17, 2013, 3:47 PM CST) (on file with author). 
117 The Alabama Trust for Boards of Education website is available at 
http://www.dwighthester.com/ATBE.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
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. concerned from an underwriting standpoint about nature 
and scope of coverage, as well as pricing for coverage.118  
 
While this official’s comments are more general, his impression is 
that reinsurers do influence pool underwriting operations, mostly from the 
coverage standpoint, which relates back to the follow the fortunes aspect.  
The reinsurer has to make sure the cedent’s interests align with theirs. 
As to reinsurers’ underwriting influence, the current senior official 
of AGRiP indicates a wide range of influence: 
 
Pools absolutely have accepted input from the reinsurers to 
influence their practices, operations – even policies.  This 
can be very subtle.  For example, a reinsurer might ask, 
when underwriting a pool, if they have policies and 
procedures for cancelling or non-renewing a member that 
will not comply with loss control requirements.  I have 
known pools without such formal procedures to develop 
them, not because their reinsurer ‘required’ it, but because 
they recognized [the procedure] as a good proactive 
[policy], and they wanted to make themselves more 
attractive to reinsurers in the future.  Other areas I have 
seen influenced by reinsurers include rating and pricing; 
building and holding adequate surplus; better claim 
management procedures; and coverage issues, to name a 
few.119   
 
These comments appear to verify that even suggestions from 
reinsurers, because of their broader market knowledge and experience, take 
on a great deal of influence, even though they were not requirements.  This 
official continues: 
 
Reinsurers . . . have provided pools with general advice 
through forums, [such as] AGRiP conferences.  For 
                                                                                                                 
118 E-mail from senior official, Ala. Trust for Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc. (June 20, 2013, 2:44 PM CST) (on file with author). 
119 E-mail from current senior official, Ass’n of Governmental Risk Pools 
(AGRiP), to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (Apr. 29, 2013, 11:09 AM CST) (on file 
with author).    
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example, reinsurers have produced [conference] sessions 
on how to effectively partner with your reinsurer.  The 
sessions gave input on things to include in the underwriting 
submission, such as:  evidence of pool policies that require 
members to embrace loss control advice or risk being non-
renewed; information about rating plans that include 
experience rating to incent better risk management; [and] 
operational structures that demonstrate an alignment of 
incentives between staff or vendors with the goal of 
reducing losses, as opposed to a managing general 
underwriter structure where the vendor is incented to grow 
the top line with no skin in the game for the bottom line.120  
 
These conference programs appear to be the first truly indirect 
form of reinsurer influence discussed by a participant.121 While 
understandably, reinsurers give such presentations to assist pools in 
becoming more efficient and more able to be reinsured (and to raise the 
reinsurers’ visibility), they are also attempting on a broader scale to 
influence pools in general.  This training potentially makes the reinsurance 
market more accessible to pools, and more expansive and profitable for 
reinsurers. 
As to underwriting, the former senior official with AGRiP 
indicated: 
 
[Underwriting] suggestions generally are subtle ‘strong 
hints’, such as reinsurers indicating they could lower the 
premium by X dollars if members were required, under the 
coverage agreement, to confer with a pool designated 
defense counsel before taking any adverse employment 
actions.  Or, for example, if coverage excluded diving 
boards over five meters high.  Or, if coverage excluded 
playground equipment on hard surfaces such as asphalt or 
concrete.122 
                                                                                                                 
120 E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. 
(June 10, 2013, 7:11 AM CST) (on file with author).    
121 Arguably, these presentations take a similar form as the “University of 
Farmers” insurance commercials. 
122 E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. 
(May 24, 2013, 2:26 PM CST) (on file with author).    
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All of the examples are incentive-based; while assisting the pool in 
having fewer losses, they also minimize severity, and the chance the 
reinsurers’ thresholds are broken.  However, this appears to be the same 
type of influence as when your local government offers lower water rates 
per gallon for more frugal usage.  Also, note the use of the term ‘subtle’ by 
both AGRiP officials.  This will be seen next as well. 
A reinsurer underwriter for the Government Entities Mutual, 
Inc.,123 indicated reinsurers did have a substantive impact on pools.  He 
focused on the underwriting influence: 
 
I would say over time, reinsurers are moving from direct 
influence to indirect influence.  This seems to be a function 
of the market conditions, and in this extended soft market 
(since post-9/11), reinsurers’ demands of their reinsureds 
are becoming more and more requests.  This is, of course, 
related to not wanting to give up market share [or] being 
perceived . . . that [reinsurance] coverage is based on a set 
of operational demands.   
 
[As to influence], Government Entities Mutual, Inc. has a 
pricing methodology that includes schedule credits which 
reward/penalize our member pools for practicing ‘good’ 
risk behavior and not practicing ‘bad’ risk behavior.  A 
little more about this:  the [reinsurance underwriting] 
categories allow up to +/-15% debits/credits.  The several 
categories are both subjective and relatively objective.  The 
metrics for each category are definitely subjectively chosen 
by GEM staff.  For instance: being AGRiP ‘recognized’124 
affords -1% off the written premium.  GEM has 
determined that going through the self-evaluation process 
of the AGRiP recognition process is an indicator of a good 
risk pool.  Remember, GEM is assessing the risk of the 
pool, while pools are assessing the risk of its 
members.  So, the fact that we have correlated risk with 
                                                                                                                 
123 The Government Entities Mutual, Inc., website is available at 
http://www.gemre.com/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
124  See generally ASS’N OF GOVERNMENTAL RISK POOLS, WWW.agrip.org (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2014) (for a detailed discussion of debits and credits). 
86  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 21.1 
 
AGRiP recognition is relatively objective, but the metric of 
-1%/0/+1% [for varying categories] is subjective. 
  
Speaking outside of GEM, I know that reinsurers pricing 
models have a lot more ‘wiggle’ room than GEM’s +/-
15%.  Some up to 40%.  The rationale for this is the 
limited ability of their experience and exposure based 
pricing methods, usually blaming the pool’s lack of 
experience in the reinsurance layers [for] not being able to 
credibly predict risk and therefore [being able to] predict 
pricing.  Each reinsurer has their own ‘wiggle’ 
methodology, but ultimately they are looking to assess the 
soft risk elements versus the cold, hard black and white of 
the losses and exposure counts.  Specifically, I know other 
reinsurers collect a lot of the same soft data that GEM 
collects, such as claims audits, tort climates, and 
underwriting guidelines. 
 
Specific input might come in the way of reinsurer 
audits.  For instance, most reinsurers want at least a claims 
audit and underwriting audit of the reinsured before they 
write the business.  Within the audits are pros and cons of 
the reinsured’s operations, as well as ways to 
improve.  When subsequent audits are performed, the first 
thing an auditor usually looks at are the ‘management 
recommendations’ from the previous audit.  These point to 
whether management has been responsive to the reinsurers 
recommendations.  The majority of the reinsurers want 
financially solvent pools, so they target the major 
contributors to that end.  Underwriting and claims are the 
biggest two, followed by loss control and accounting.  
Because a well-functioning pool has [their own] long term 
underwriting and rating standards, and [these pools] 
attempt to minimize claims payouts by proactively 
defending frivolous and calamitous claims.125 
                                                                                                                 
125 E-mails from reinsurance underwriter, Gov’t Entities Mut., Inc., to 
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:12 AM EST and May 9, 2013, 3:08 
PM CST) (on file with author). 
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This underwriter outlines a very good overview of how reinsurer 
incentives operate.  Reinsurers want to give premium discounts, as this 
assists reinsurers in their influence of pools.  Reinsurers are attempting to 
influence pools to have lower loss ratios, since, under the follow the 
fortunes doctrine, this is optimal for both parties, although more so for the 
reinsurer.  This underwriter seems to encourage transparency and good 
faith in the underwriting process for the benefit of both.  This appears to be 
a very substantial argument for reinsurer underwriting influence on pools.   
As to the underwriting influence overall, the general 
characterization of reinsurer influence was characterized by the participants 
as ‘indirect.’  However, while the influence is not as direct as it could be, 
being influenced by reinsurers’ suggestions, even subtle ones, appears to be 
a form of direct influence, unlike the indirect influence of conference 
programs.  There appears to be, direct or subtle, very much a governance 




The area of claims differs from underwriting in that it is more 
subjective, from a reinsurer’s standpoint.  The reinsurer influence varies 
based on many more factors in claims, as can be seen from participant’s 
responses. 
The senior official for the Alabama Trust for Boards of Education 
indicated: 
 
[Reinsurers] are particularly interested in how claims are 
managed and by whom.  They are interested enough in [the 
pools’] claims management that they typically conduct 
regular, periodic audits of all claim files that may in any 
way pose exposure to the re-insurance layer of coverage.126 
 
The claim audits are a theme that will arise repeatedly.  Because 
reinsurers can’t get an objective view of claims by reserve numbers or 
claim counts, they must actually touch the files to ensure that the pool is 
overseeing the claims in a reasonable fashion.  Additionally, pool personnel 
must meet with reinsurer personnel—this is partly for explanations of files, 
                                                                                                                 
126 E-mail from senior official, Ala. Trust for Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc. supra note 118. 
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as well as to investigate the capabilities of the claim staff.  These oversight 
actions are governance (or regulatory) in nature. 
The senior official for the County Commissioners Association of 
Pennsylvania indicated: 
 
In our experience, [influence] is not about specific 
operational matters and never about specifics of personnel.  
But it could be about staffing (levels of loss control 
services for example) and, since we provide claims 
services, [reinsurers] are interested in our claims staff 
performance.  We provide member satisfaction survey 
results and copies of claims audits so they can have factual 
information about our service quality.127 
 
Here we see interest in claim staff performance again—the 
reinsurer wishes to oversee, to some degree, the subjective, and the pool 
agrees to this oversight.  
A former senior official with the Washington Schools Risk 
Management Pool128 emphasized some reinsurance influence on claim 
operations, indicating: 
 
Pools influenced by reinsurers . . . it depends.  We take 
recommendations from any reinsurer claims audit very 
seriously, especially as it relates to claims industry 
practices.  We just had our two reinsurers complete their 
annual claims audit and we are following up on a 
recommendation to tighten up on reserve documentation.  
The reserve documentation was in the form of a 
recommendation and not as a strict requirement.  But I do 
think it is important to maintain a good working 
relationship with our reinsurer and would comply with 
                                                                                                                 
127 E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 107. 
128 The Washington Schools Risk Management Pool website is available at 
http://www.wsrmp.com/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
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their recommendations if they make good business sense, 
as the reserve documentation recommendation was. 129 
 
As this official indicates, they take the audits “very” seriously from 
their reinsurer, and it appears annual audits are required.  The 
recommendation arising from the audit was not put forth as a requirement.  
The recommendation was a formal suggestion, and the pool gave it 
consideration because it made sense, but also indicated acceptance because 
of the need for a good working relationship.  While this official may feel 
less influence, regularly accepted audits (even if contractually required) 
and a desire to maintain the relationship (which are not contractually 
required) indicates a fair degree of influence from the reinsurer. 
A senior official with the Montana School Group Insurance 
Authority,130 the administrator for the Montana School Board Association’s 
program, felt both underwriting, in coverage offerings, and claim 
operations were most influenced, but focused on the claim operations as an 
example.  He said: 
 
Pools are influenced by reinsurers.  The right reinsurance 
partner is critical for the long-term success of the primary 
pool.  The ability to provide stable and competitive 
reinsurance costs [is] one of the largest pieces of the 
primary pool’s pricing formula which in turn has a direct 
impact on [how] competitive the primary pool can be in its 
membership market space.  The other is the right 
reinsurance products for the primary pool.  Often one 
reinsurance carrier will not provide the right type of 
coverage, coverage structure, or limits needed.  So, to find 
the perfect fit takes some work on the primary pool’s 
part.  For some pools that is a mono-state arrangement, 
others it is multi-state, and some are countrywide.  The 
influence a reinsurance relationship has on the primary will 
drive certain procedural behaviors with regard to both 
                                                                                                                 
129 E-mails from former senior official, Wash. Sch. Risk Mgmt. Pool, to 
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. (June 12, 2013, 12:09 PM EST and 3:34 PM CST) (on 
file with author). 
130 The Montana School Group Insurance Authority website is available at 
http://www.msgia.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
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policy and procedural development in the areas that will be 
impacted by the reinsurance pricing. 
  
The best example is claim handling procedures and related 
policies.  Because the reinsurance submission process is 
becoming more formalized as pooling development has 
evolved, the primary pools are much more carefully 
crafting claim handling procedures and policies which 
model what they believe to be national best practices in 
this area.  The submission process involves sharing the 
detailed outside or third party claim audit reports of your 
operations with your reinsurance partner as well as your 
own state and local pool claim guidelines and 
procedures.  A reinsurer then analyzes these procedures 
and compares them with the outcomes seen in the claim 
data sets acquired from the primary pool as part of the 
reinsurance submission process.  While the reinsurance 
does not have any direct control over the primary pool with 
regard to mandates for changes in the primary pool 
procedures, suggestions are offered.  The reinsurers I have 
worked with provide those based on multiple operations 
they have worked with and offer what they believe to be 
the best practices.  So, it is the indirect influence or 
regulator feel provided through the reinsurance relationship 
that creates certain behaviors in pooling operations.  The 
larger the pool, the more procedures and staff that are 
involved, [then] the larger the interactions [are] between 
the reinsurance carrier and the primary pool. 
 
Influence on coverage issues I have still seen [are] driven 
by the type of reinsurance/excess contract, with the 
reinsurance style contracts affording the settlement 
authority to the primary pools.  Our pool, as do many, still 
involve the reinsurer as the claim progresses and even in 
the final decision making process of settlement versus 
continued defense.  Reporting requirements in the contracts 
with the reinsurers ensures they get to be involved prior to 
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the self-insured retention131 being breached for most 
instances.   We have been involved with several liability 
claims where we have received very good input from the 
reinsurance legal group regarding ways to approach and 
structure defenses for our primary pool members.  Our 
defense counsel for the pool has usually been very 
receptive to that type of input.132 
 
Note how this senior official continues to go back to the benefits of the 
relationship, the early involvement of the reinsurer, and the claim specific 
advice.  He mentions “suggestions are offered” that “create certain 
behaviors”; governance creates certain behaviors as well.  Regardless of the 
example of influence he is discussing, or if one would consider it direct or 
indirect, it is very apparent both parties perceive their relationship to be one 
of utmost good faith, rather than the arms-length relationship contemplated 
by some reinsurance commentators previously documented. 
 A senior official with the North Carolina School Boards 
Association, the third party administrator for the North Carolina School 
Boards Trust133 felt there was reinsurer claims influence: 
 
Yes, [there is influence], at least to some extent.  I think 
the level of reinsurer influence is in part dependent on the 
sophistication level of the pool staff and also probably the 
size of the pool.134  Smaller pools with less experienced, 
less sophisticated staff are likely to be more receptive to 
                                                                                                                 
131  A self-insured retention (SIR) is defined as: “A dollar amount specified in 
a liability insurance policy that must be paid by the insured before the insurance 
policy will respond to a loss. Thus, under a policy written with a SIR provision, the 
insured (rather than the insurer) would pay defense and/or indemnity costs 
associated with a claim until the SIR limit was reached. After that point, the 
insurer would make any additional payments for defense and indemnity that were 
covered by the policy.” Self-Insured Retention (SIR), INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., 
http://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/s/self-insured-retention-
sir.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014) (emphasis in original). 
132  E-mail from senior official, Mont. Sch. Grp. Ins. Auth., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc. (June 18, 2013, 10:34 AM CST) (on file with author).    
133 The North Carolina School Boards Trust website is available at, 
http://www.ncsba.org/risk-management/the-north-carolina-school-boards-trust/ 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
134 This factor will be seen again. 
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reinsurer suggestions on changes to improve internal claim 
procedures or with handling coverage and reservation of 
rights issues, or other internal changes.135 
 
While this official did not seem to be referring to her own pool, it seems 
natural that less experienced pools would be more willing to accept 
guidance from business partners, using reinsurers’ governance to their 
advantage.  
The senior official from the Park District Risk Management 
Agency mentioned claims in detail: 
 
The reinsurers do review our claims procedures, but 
mainly from the point of view that they want to be 
confident that we have competent staff, have specific 
internal controls in place, and the process is 
documented.  While we write our reinsurance agreements 
so that, in most cases, PDRMA retains the ability to 
control the claim, we do have specific reporting procedures 
to the reinsurer and in some cases need written approval 
prior to settling a claim.  We comply with those 
requirements and try to be much more proactive and 
cooperative with the reinsurers when they may be paying 
on a claim.136 
 
This certainly is direct influence; the most interesting example is the 
reinsurer’s insistence to go beyond ‘follow the fortunes’, in that in some 
instances the reinsurer must sign off on certain settlements.  These 
reinsurer ‘requirements’ are complied with proactively by the pool, and 
appear to be behavior changing influence, governing in nature.  Again, this 
influence, or governance, is freely accepted by the pool.  
The senior official representing the Arizona School Risk Retention 
Trust, Inc., discussed the large amount of interaction their claim personnel 
had with their reinsurer:   
 
                                                                                                                 
135 E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc. (July 8, 2013, 2:48 PM CST) (on file with author).    
136 E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency, to Assistant 
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 110.    
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Our . . . lead liability claims adjuster, along with our lead 
defense counsel, meets with our reinsurers in person twice 
a year to conduct intensive case reviews.  [The adjuster] 
also provides updates throughout the year as reserves 
change.  We recently had three large liability claims that 
reached into the reinsurance layers.  The ultimate 
settlements negotiated by our adjuster were less than the 
reinsurers reserves amounts by approximately 30% to 50% 
of the reinsurers’ total reserves.  These results build our 
credibility with the reinsurers and illustrate that we do not 
fall victim to unnecessary influence from the reinsurers. 
 
Our lead property adjuster also has a terrific working 
relationship with our reinsurers.  The Trust members have 
experienced some substantial and unusual claims in recent 
years.  The lead property adjuster has spent many hours 
negotiating with our members and with the reinsurer.  
Arizona is a state that is much different from other states 
when it comes to weather which results in claims from our 
members.  We recently have had some major hail damage 
and water intrusion claims that were closed for much less 
than the reinsurer expected.  The lead property reinsurer 
had to explain how flooding in Arizona, which is typically 
sheet flooding, is much different than flooding in other 
states.  Having a good working relationship with the 
reinsurer made for much smoother claims resolutions.137 
 
In allowing the heightened interaction to avoid ‘unnecessary influence’ 
(and to create a good business relationship), are pools, by this very act, 
allowing some measure of governance?  While this official may not 
characterize it as such, this ongoing monitoring and level of interaction 
with the reinsurer appears to be a sign of reinsurer governance.   
The senior official with the Maryland Association of Boards of 
Education felt there was little influence in his operation.  He notes: 
 
For the run of the mill claims we handle and know the 
value will not approach the retention, the reinsurer is 
                                                                                                                 
137 E-mail from senior official, Ashton Tiffany, LLC, to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 112.    
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uninvolved.  And the vast number of claims we handle are 
well below our retentions and therefore do not involve the 
reinsurers.  We handle the claims, determine the coverage 
and extend authority without reinsurance involvement.  
The reinsurer only gets involved when the value of the 
claim makes it reportable to them or the claim meets 
certain criteria, sometimes for severity.138  
 
This official has seen much less influence in claims, indicating little of the 
interaction mentioned by others. 
The current official with AGRiP noted claim audits and 
recommendations: 
 
On the specific level [regarding claims], in meetings 
between the pool management and reinsurers, there is often 
discussion of specific claims, how they were handled, and 
how similar claims might be better handled in the future. 
Through reinsurer claim audits, specific recommendations 
of better staffing or supervisory models might be given.  
For example, one reinsurer requested that the pool hire a 
full time litigation manager to oversee the third party 
administrator and [outside] legal counsel to control 
litigation costs and improve outcomes.  [Or], in the review 
of the coverage documents, concerns about interpretation 
of language might arise.  One specific example that has 
come up several times in my experience relates to the 
determination of the date of loss and number of ‘events’ in 
situations such as sexual abuse in a school system, which 
led to clarification of language.  Often the reinsurer might 
recommend things, and the pool may or may not make the 
change and the reinsurer may or may not continue to write 
the account.139 
 
This official sees specific claim handling input by reinsurers, even staffing 
requests.  As she indicates, the pool might accept the recommendations or 
                                                                                                                 
138 E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 114.  
139 E-mail from current senior official, Ass’n of Governmental Risk Pools 
(AGRiP), to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 120.    
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might not, but if it does, it seems to be accepting a form of governance in 
the process.  
The former AGRiP senior official gave a response that showed not 
only the method of influence, the pool’s effort in a claims setting towards 
utmost good faith: 
 
A secondary influence is what [reinsurers] establish as 
thresholds for reporting claims to them; and how reinsurers 
influence claims adjustment at the pool level.  Reinsurers 
influence can be limited at times.  For example, reinsurers 
seem to have a hard time understanding why public entity 
pools are willing to spend more money on defense than 
[third party] claim payments.140  I remember years ago [at a 
previous employer] having a study done of our in-house 
Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group141 litigation 
management program.  The consultants said we were not 
doing a very effective job because we were spending $7 for 
litigation for each $3 in losses; when it should have been 
the other way - $3/$7.  When I asked about how much we 
spent in total compared to others they replied, ‘Oh, about 
one-third.’  I was very pleased that our strategy was 
working so well.142  
 
This official, while acknowledging reinsurers can manipulate claim 
reporting and how claims are adjusted, also showed that by a pool 
demonstrating utmost good faith, the influence is lessened.  Here, the pool 
showed their institutional reasoning and success in the defense of claims, 
and the reinsurer appears to have been accepting, showing utmost good 
faith in kind.  But the governance is still present. 
                                                                                                                 
140 It is the author’s experience this is due to the common interests of pool 
members. Pools do not want certain types of claims to be settled, no matter how 
economically feasible because governmental entity settlements are well publicized.  
Settlements can also cause ripple effects of further litigation against other similarly 
situated pool members, where members feel there is no liability in a particular 
situation or members are defending a common policy position, such as dress codes. 
141 The Oklahoma Municipal Assurance Group website is available at 
http://www.omag.org (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
142 E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 122.    
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The underwriter for the Government Entities Mutual, Inc., spoke of 
claim audits as well: 
 
[W]e determine the effectiveness of a GEM member 
[pool’s] claims operation by assessing [our] claims 
audit.  [W]e correlate the risk to the reinsurance layer to 
the effectiveness of the claims operation.  [In the claims] 
category, its measure and metric are much more subjective, 
since all claims operations behave very differently.143 
 
The GEM underwriter points out the subjective nature of reinsurance 
oversight of claim operations.  It appears this very subjectivity allows for 
governance to be asserted and accepted by the pools. 
The senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property 
and Casualty, Inc., noted: 
 
I have not received any reinsurer suggestions on claim 
procedures, coverage issue handling, or authority . . . these 
matters are handled in accordance with and subject to the 
pool’s coverage document, which is provided to the 
reinsurer in advance of its decision to enter into a treaty 
with the pool.144 
 
This appeared to be the least claim influence of those that opined; much 
less so than the underwriting influence this pool felt. 
Due to the subjectivity in the reinsurer oversight of claim 
operations, reinsurers have more opportunities in claims for governance.  
Because of the imprecise nature of claim operations—which can vary 
widely based on claim philosophies, enforcement of those philosophies, 
experience of the personnel, and workload—reinsurers usually must have a 
greater hands-on approach when determining the amount of governance to 
insist upon.  As most of the participants indicated, there was a great deal of 
interaction, which appears to be governance. 
                                                                                                                 
143 E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc. (April 30, 2013, 11:12 AM CST) (on file with author). 
144 E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous. Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to  
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 101. 




While not as many comments discussed directly the financial 
aspect of pooling, or at least not that could be easily unwound from other 
subjects, the comments given showed finances of the pool and the 
profitability of the reinsurers as strong motivating factors for reinsurers to 
assert some form of governance over the pools. 
The senior official with the Texas Association of School Boards, 
Inc., stated: 
 
I also believe that most pools, like any organization, are 
driven by an inherent desire to survive, so financial 
viability is a powerful motivator . . . I think reinsurance 
plays an important part in the financial viability of a pool, 
but more from a funding and claims protection standpoint 
than a regulatory standpoint.  Although, as stated earlier, 
reinsurers carry a big stick, so to the extent that they want 
to impose certain practices by a pool, the pool is likely to 
comply.145 
 
While this official mentions that the important part of a reinsurers influence 
is not regulatory in nature, it may only be semantically different.  The 
imposition of certain practices is certainly governance in nature; ‘sway’ as 
the Oxford English Dictionary termed it.146 
The senior official of the Alabama Trust for Boards of Education 
discussed the reinsurers’ interest in the pools’ finances: 
 
Because of the obvious financial self-interest, reinsurers 
are concerned about the financial condition and status of 
any pool, whether start-up or well-established . . . My 
personal observations concerning multiple pools of various 
sizes in multiple states is that, again, due to financial self-
interest, re-insurers sometimes have more hands-on 
involvement and influence in the solvency and success of 
                                                                                                                 
145 E-mail from senior official, TASB, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc. 
(April 30, 2013, 9:59 AM CST) (on file with author). 
146 “Governance” definition, supra note 2. 
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public entity pools that any insurance or administrative 
regulators would have.147 
 
As this official obliquely notes, state regulators are concerned about an 
entity’s solvency in an abstract manner.  For reinsurers, it is their money 
and their livelihoods at stake.  This greatly increases the incentive to assert 
influence. 
The GEM underwriter also noted reinsurers gaining a greater 
understanding of pools and an increased interest in writing pools: 
 
Plain and simple:  profit.  Reinsurers, as any financial 
institution, [are] looking to make return with their 
capital.  Pools and the risk of public entities have proved 
profitable.  Pools, as an industry, have matured to the point 
with reinsurers [not being] as skeptical of them as they 
were at the beginning . . . Perhaps this is indirectly related 
to the ‘suggestions’ made by the reinsurers, or just a 
natural evolution of any industry. 
 
There are new ‘shops’ set up recently trying to go after 
pool business.  This means it is profitable.  This also means 
that the reinsurance community is becoming more and 
more enamored of pools . . . [T]here is a comfort level with 
pools that has grown over time.  I would say this is mostly 
restricted to the domestic marketplace, since on the 
international scene, most reinsurers are largely unaware of 
the public entity pooling industry. 
 
Yes, there are strengths and weaknesses of pools just like 
any other risk.  One opinion I have is that the insurance 
shortage crisis that existed back in the 80’s, in which the 
pools were born,148 is not likely to return.  Insurers and 
reinsurers are well aware that public sector risk is a good 
book of business . . . I think this stems from two 
                                                                                                                 
147 E-mail from senior official, Ala. Trust for Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 118. 
148 Due to the insurance crisis, the 1980s saw the greatest expansion of pools, 
but as discussed above, governmental entity pooling was born in 1974 in Austin, 
Texas.  See discussion, supra note 18. 
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components of pools.  First, they are mutually owned by 
public entities, and most of the time are run in the best 
interest of the actual risk.  Second, over the history of 
pooling, there have been far fewer insolvencies than the 
commercial insurance industry.  As proof, in the last 
couple of years, there are three new reinsurance shops that 
have started writing public entity pools around the 
country.  These are private companies who did not 
formerly write in the space, and it can only be deduced that 
there is profit to be made.149 
 
Based on the underwriter’s comments, he believes pools have matured to 
the point that reinsurers’ are interested in this segment of the market, which 
may be leading to less direct influence, as noted earlier.  The more 
reinsurer competition, the less each reinsurer can assert its direct influence.  
However, because finances are growing stronger in the pooling industry, 
the reinsurers have every motivation to keep the pools as efficient as 
possible.  It appears the reinsurers are matching the level of governance 
influence to individual pools, and the methods can vary as to how they 
achieve these goals.  
Not everyone felt a close pooling-reinsurer relationship in the 
financial area.  The senior official with the Idaho Counties Risk 
Management Program stated: 
 
For better or worse, I predict pools’ relationships with 
reinsurance . . . markets will continue to be more data 
driven and less personal.  I also believe reinsurers will 
continue to view pool business more as a market to be in or 
out of and this will lead to service behaviors more in line 
with a commodity rather than a personalized financial 
product priced on the underlying pool’s operational 
competence.150 
 
However, it seems clear the reinsurers’ approach observed by this 
official would be less influential—after all, the less engagement, 
                                                                                                                 
149 E-mails from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 125. 
150 E-mail from senior official, ICRMP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra 
note 116.    
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the less influence that can be asserted from a distance.  If reinsurers 
were to trend towards less engagement, it would be counter-




There were a few comments of a more general nature, but 
enlightening nonetheless.   
The senior official with the County Commissioners Association of 
Pennsylvania said: 
 
Yes, I think this is somewhat natural [that pools are 
influenced by reinsurers], if pools believe as we do, that 
reinsurers are partners in our program.  There are not a 
large number of reinsurers interested in public entity 
exposures, especially some of the more niche coverages 
like law enforcement (police, jails, probation) and nursing 
home professional liability.  Pools cannot afford to treat 
reinsurers like they are just another vendor, which can 
easily be replaced.  We expect our members to view our 
pool as a long-term commitment, and we extend that same 
philosophy to our reinsurers.  We meet with them every 
year to discuss the renewal, but just as importantly to get 
their feedback, to find out what is new in the industry.151   
 
Note that there is organizational commitment passed through from the 
member to the pool to the reinsurer.  Additionally, this senior official 
indicates the preference to have reinsurers as partners, rather than as a 
commodity.  Because of their differing roles, a certain amount of influence 
inevitably occurs when reinsurers have a financial interest in the pools’ 
performances.  Much like neighbors looking after each other’s houses, 
there is some inherent interest in making sure all is well. 
The underwriter for the Government Entities Mutual, Inc., the 
reinsurer, indicated: 
 
I don’t think it is possible to influence specific behavior of 
pool employees/third party administrator personnel, but 
                                                                                                                 
151 E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 107. 
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[reinsurers can influence the] general goals and metrics for 
the entire company.  For instance, we offer a discount on 
premiums for financial loss ratios being under, say, 
100%.  There are a number of ways to achieve this, 
including loss control requirements, claims management 
procedures, coverage offerings/issues, and/or rate 
adequacy.  So, by offering that carrot, we are incentivizing 
a steady business model and solvent pools, but how the 
pool accomplishes that, and with what employees, is their 
decision.152 
 
Again, this is the softer approach that yields potentially broader results by 
agreement with the pools.  But all of his examples are regulatory in nature, 
even if voluntarily accepted. 
As a final note for Part A, the former senior official with AGRiP 
stated: 
 
As I have observed and worked with pools the past 34 
years, I came to the realization that reinsurers do in fact 
‘call the shots’ for the vast majority of pools; although a 
number of pool officials would argue to the contrary.  But 
since most pools assume very little risk they are at the 
mercy of the reinsurance community when developing 
coverage terms and rates.153 
 
This statement encompasses a great deal of the initial findings for this Part 
regarding the impact of reinsurers on pools generally, and specifically on 
their underwriting, claims and finance operations.  “Calling the shots”, as 
this official described it, and the pools’ acceptance of this approach, 
certainly seems to be reinsurer governance. 
In this sub-Part, there were various characterizations by the 
participants of reinsurers’ influence on pools, mostly in underwriting and 
claims.  However, these interviews, to this author, demonstrate that the 
governance effect—the behavior changing ability—by reinsurers has been 
substantively felt among the pooling market.  The degree of influence may 
                                                                                                                 
152 E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc. (May 9, 2013, 3:08 PM CST) (on file with author). 
153 E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 122. 
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be situational, but seems constant as to most pools.  As we will see in this 
next sub-Part, there is a great deal more consensus as to the core of the 
relationship, the utmost good faith concept. 
 
B. DUTY OF UTMOST GOOD FAITH 
 
A second point, “utmost good faith,” arose from this examination 
of reinsurer influence.  In an era when courts are struggling with the 
traditional concept of utmost good faith between reinsured and reinsurer, 
are the parties to reinsurance contracts themselves moving away from the 
utmost good faith concept of long intertwined relationships built on trust?  
Are we seeing a move throughout the industry towards an arms-length 
transaction between two sophisticated parties?  Are cedents pushing 
reinsurers away from simple treaty agreements and towards sophisticated 
reinsurance agreements?154 Simply put, are cedents treating reinsurance like 
a commodity, and moving away from engaging in utmost good faith? 
While the term “utmost good faith” was not used in any survey 
questions, most of the respondents, unprompted, described the 
transparency, trust and long-term relationships they felt with their current 
reinsurers, as well as the engagement, education, and assistance they 
received from their reinsurers—all hallmarks of uberrima fides.  Utmost 
good faith still appears to be a vibrant element in pooling.  This seems to 
show that utmost good faith is not only still relevant in this market, but also 
necessary for the success of the relationship.  Additionally, the pools 
generally had the same high level of transparency and depth with their 
reinsurers they had with their own members, the same “utmost good faith” 
in both transactions.  While some courts and authors believe that the utmost 
good faith doctrine in reinsurance has gone past its usefulness,155 the 
author’s research with pools indicates the concept of utmost good faith is 
expanding, and is necessary for both parties to gain from the relationship.  
Indeed, this advantage goes well beyond financial gain in pooling, for both 
cedent and reinsurer.  
                                                                                                                 
154 It seems obvious that reinsurers who suspect their cedents are playing “hide 
the ball” in violation of the spirit of utmost good faith are later going to take legal 
steps to not follow the fortunes of their cedent. 
155 OSTRAGER & VYSKOCIL, supra note 69 at 3-22 (citing Unigard Sec. Ins. 
Co. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F. 3d 1049, 1066, 2d Cir. (1993)).  See also Thomas, 
supra note 81. 
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The current senior official of AGRiP said: “Over time, either a 
good professional relationship of trust and mutual respect emerges, or not, 
and this influences who does business with who.”156 Again, while there is 
reinsurer influence, long-term relationships are what makes this truly 
beneficial for both parties.  This official indicates that if both parties cannot 
influence the relationship, then perhaps they should not be in business 
together. 
The senior official for the North Carolina School Boards Trust 
stated: 
 
Another factor that may increase the level of reinsurer 
influence (which is true in our case) is the length of the 
reinsurer/pool relationship.  We have worked with our 
current reinsurer for the past six years, and over that 
timeframe a mutual trust and respect has developed 
between [the NCSB] Trust staff and reinsurer staff about 
our programs and processes, as well as reinsurance 
expectations.  Because of the positive working relationship 
that we have developed, both parties seem interested in 
helping the other.  When we have annual renewal 
meetings, our reinsurer is very helpful in responding and 
providing input to our plans for coverage changes and 
other programmatic changes we might be contemplating, 
without being too imposing or forcing changes on us.  The 
working relationship has been extremely positive, and even 
though we initially felt that some of their reporting 
expectations were a bit onerous, we now have a better 
understanding of why they require us to report the way we 
do.  Generally, we have found the input from our reinsurer 
to be helpful, and we try to accommodate them to continue 
the positive relationship that we have with them.  By the 
same token, I think they try to accommodate us in certain 
ways because they find the relationship worth the effort.157 
 
                                                                                                                 
156 E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 120.    
157 E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 135.   
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Here, the reinsurer is seen as a valued partner, one with whom there is 
mutual trust and respect, as well as a source of industry information.  This 
pool came to accept and understand the governance exerted by the 
reinsurer.  This realization of understanding the needs of the reinsurer made 
the pool’s acceptance much easier, and led to a better relationship.  This 
greater interaction shows utmost good faith in the flow of information. 
The former senior official with AGRiP stated: 
 
[I] have also concluded that most in the reinsurance 
community who are committed to the long-term success of 
pools work very hard to appreciate the unique 
characteristics of public entity exposures and 
finances.  This has developed as a symbiotic relationship, 
although, in my opinion, reinsurers exert more influence 
than pool officials generally are willing to concede.  In the 
late 70’s and early 80’s, I experienced any number of 
reinsurance business executives who “knew better than the 
public administrators” as to how to conduct an insurance 
operation.  Perhaps they did, but the public administrators 
knew how to manage diversity – leading to the long-term 
success of pooled risk management for public entities, of 
which the “insurance” is just one component. One of my 
signature phrases is “public entities cooperating together to 
manage their risks is what differentiates pooling from 
traditional insurance.”158 
 
While mentioning the effect of reinsurer influence again, this is the 
first mention of the “symbiotic” relationship, a concept that will come up 
again later.  It is this symbiosis that makes this relationship work; requiring 
utmost good faith, as well an understanding of each other’s business 
interests. 
The senior official with the Maryland Association of School 
Boards indicated: 
 
We have always thought that providing reinsurers with 
accurate data on the front-end will make us a pool they can 
trust and work with.  We work very hard to provide them 
                                                                                                                 
158  E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant. Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 122. 
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with the data they need, so as to make it easy to write our 
account.159 
 
Again, this official solidifies the notion of trust as being paramount in this 
relationship. 
Transparency, a vital element of utmost good faith, seemed to be 
very much on the respondents’ minds.  The underwriter from GEM 
attributed it to the origin of governmental entity pooling, when asked if 
pools were more transparent than traditional insurers, from his reinsurance 
point of view: 
 
Absolutely.  The first and obvious reason is that many 
pools fall under various states’ freedom of information 
acts, while traditional insurers are constantly developing 
innovative and propriety products to beat their 
competition.  Secondly, although I have only been in 
pooling for 8 years, it seems the culture of transparency 
has been around since the beginning.  This includes 
transparency within the membership of each pool, as well 
as within the pooling community around the country.160 
 
It is this transparency that leads to the concept of utmost good faith being 
not only possible, but embraced. 
Transparency was again mentioned by the senior official from the 
Texas Association of School Boards, Inc.  She felt, like others, this 
transparency began with the basis of pooling, open governments: 
 
I believe most pools started out of a governmental mind-
set.  They were started either by governmental associations 
or by government employees.  As a result, I think there 
was an inherent sense of open operations, similar to open 
government.  That awareness that anyone can come in and 
look at your operations, coupled with a general desire to 
                                                                                                                 
159 E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 114. 
160 E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc. (July 9, 2013, 10:17 AM CST) (on file with author). 
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‘do good’ resulted in a self-governance mind-set for most 
pools.161 
 
The transparency described is key to utmost good faith thriving—just the 
knowledge by a reinsurer that the pool has this inherent philosophical 
outlook builds confidence on the part of the reinsurer.   
Probably the most interesting comment on the pool-reinsurer 
relationship was from the senior official with the Montana School Group 
Insurance Authority.  Perhaps unknowingly, he addressed the doctrine of 
utmost good faith in his detailed discussion of high-level relationships with 
reinsurers: 
 
The reinsurers seek what many of the primary pools seek 
with their members—a long-term relationship with a 
downstream member (customer) that is willing to listen to 
the risk and claim management advice of their upstream 
partner.  If all three of the players in the relationship share 
and deploy best practices with regard to these two 
disciplines, then the relationship is bound to generate a 
profitable relationship for all.  Having a reinsurer that is 
willing to get to know the primary pool operations, long-
term goals and the management team can go a long way 
with primary pool reinsurance pricing and willingness to 
offer needed structural elements to meet the coverage 
needs.  Trust and relationships is as much a part of this 
level of the business as the raw data sets.  Both are 
important but if you have the trust that your partner will do 
the right things over the long-term to benefit all parties, 
many times we can work through some of the years when 
large claims arise and we get to know our reinsurance 
partners in a manner closer than sometimes we would 
like.162 
 
                                                                                                                 
161 E-mail from senior official, TASB, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 105. 
162 E-mail from senior official, Mont. Sch. Grp. Ins. Auth., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 132. 
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This official has embraced the doctrine of utmost good faith, and shown 
that it has the potential to benefit all, rather than be a burden, as previously 
indicated by some commentators. 
The current AGRiP senior official notes the benefits of this two-
way relationship as well: 
 
However, I must note, I likewise know that pools have 
influenced reinsurers’ understanding of, and underwriting 
requirements for, writing pools.  They have had to learn 
that the pools’ mission is to reduce risk, not create 
underwriting profit, and this has changed reinsurance 
practices for those who really have a stake in pooling.163 
 
This official has seen the broader influence of the utmost good faith 
effect—an entire section of the market can be better understood by this 
open communication.  This brings more reinsurer interest to pooling, which 
benefits the pools’ members through more reinsurance products and greater 
competition. 
 
C. HAVE POOLS BECOME MORE ACCOMMODATING TO 
REINSURERS’ INPUT? 
 
A third key finding was regarding whether pools have become 
more accommodating to reinsurers in the last decade.164 The general answer 
was yes.  Again, the responses varied, but they leaned towards pools being 
more accommodating or remaining equally accommodating in the past ten 
years as the relationships between the two industries matured.  There was a 
true willingness of the pools to open up their operations, not based on just 
the necessity to obtain reinsurance, but out of a sincere desire to have 
reinsurers understand their operations and missions.  This act of openness 
                                                                                                                 
163 E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 120. 
164 Ten years was used by the author because many officials would not have 
the experience with any longer period, and any shorter period might not be 
significant enough, or too subject to market conditions. Additionally, for accuracy 
(supra note 94), the author should have asked the broader question (see Apps. A.¶ 
2., B.¶ 5., and C.¶ 8): have pools become more or less accommodating?  However, 
based on the thoroughness of the responses, there was little indication that pools 
had recently been less accommodating to the wishes of the reinsurers—only that 
accommodation had remained constant or increased. 
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itself is an accommodation, although some officials did not perceive it as 
such.  However, the officials overall wanted their reinsurers to understand 
they were not insurers, but risk management pools.  Most participants felt a 
sense of partnership with reinsurers, cultivated that relationship on a long-
term basis and did not feel as though reinsurance was just another 
commodity. 
The senior official from the County Commissioners Association of 
Pennsylvania answered: 
 
Absolutely [pools are more accommodating].  I think a lot 
of this is because there are so few [reinsurance] companies 
to choose from.  Once you develop a long-term 
relationship with a reinsurer, and they know your 
processes, philosophy and people, you want to be able to 
continue that relationship.  If you have to change 
reinsurers, you know there will be a large investment of 
time educating the new reinsurer and working out all the 
kinks.  This is not to say I would remain with a reinsurer if 
they were overcharging me.  Price is important but it is not 
the be all and end all.  We once changed our work comp 
reinsurer because the pool board was attracted by the shiny 
objects – a small savings in premium and a two year rate 
guarantee – and we ended up going back to the reinsurer 
we left because the shiny objects [reinsurer] did not 
understand public entities. 
 
[Reinsurer] input is definitely valuable.  In pooling we sell 
the added value of all the pool services, things our 
members cannot get elsewhere.  I expect the same added 
value from our reinsurers.  They provide speakers for our 
training sessions for our members.  They advise us on 
coverage issues.  It is much more than just giving us a 
reinsurance certificate.  And I also think this helps them 
understand that we are serious about our business and want 
to do a good job.165 
 
                                                                                                                 
165 E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 107. 
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Again, we see the same discussion pattern about long-term relationships, 
and the good faith activity it takes for both parties to get to that comfort 
level and depth of understanding.  But this pool expected some greater 
accommodation from the reinsurer as well. 
The senior official with the Montana School Board Group 
Insurance Authority indicated for all the reasons he cited as to how 
reinsurers did have influence, those were the same reasons that pools had 
become more accommodating in the past ten years.166 As can been seen, 
many of these concepts, and the responses to them, can be quite 
interrelated. 
The senior official for the Arizona School Risk Retention Trust, 
Inc., indicated that the last ten years had not affected the level of 
accommodation, but attributed that to long-term relationships: 
 
In our case, I would not say we have had to become more 
accommodating due to reinsurer’s input, unless the market 
absolutely dictated a change was necessary, i.e. higher 
pricing.  The Trust has sought the opinions of our 
reinsurers for many years because we value their input and 
in most cases, it has proven to be helpful.  With the recent 
large liability losses our pool has experienced, we were 
firm in our belief that our reserve numbers were more 
accurate than what the reinsurers were suggesting.  We 
proved we were correct when the cases settled well below 
the reinsurers’ reserve amounts.  This is a factor of our 
claims staff being more familiar with the local judicial 
atmosphere and specifically, cases involving our industry 
(education), than the reinsurers. 
 
Our philosophy and actual demonstration of long-term 
partnerships makes the Trust attractive to insurers, more so 
than trying to accommodate reinsurers based on input they 
provide on how we should operate.  One of our reinsurance 
partners has been with us for over twenty years.  
We also believe that if a reinsurance carrier has paid out 
more in losses than they have received from us in 
                                                                                                                 
166 This senior official stated, “The answer is yes . . . for the reasons described 
above.”  E-mail from senior official, Mont. Sch. Grp. Ins. Auth., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 132. 
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premium, we will do what we can to remain a partner with 
that reinsurance carrier so that they are made whole over 
time.  Conversely, due to the recent competitive 
marketplace with several reinsurers vying for market share, 
it puts the pool in a powerful position to not necessarily be 
as accommodating to reinsurer’s input, if a particular 
reinsurer is suggesting unrealistic terms and conditions or 
rates.167 
 
While there was no increased accommodation on his pool’s part, it is very 
clear this was due to an ongoing and developed reinsurer relationship that 
made further accommodation unnecessary for his pool.  Note the 
willingness to stay with a reinsurer if the reinsurer had sustained losses.  
This willingness shows a great deal of accommodation—and one that the 
pool hopes will come back to benefit them.  Obviously, it took a great deal 
of time and effort to get to that point. 
Similarly, the senior official with the Maryland Association of 
School Boards felt that the accommodation level had not increased or 
decreased: 
 
I do not think that we have become more accommodating 
over the past 10 years.  We have always tried to work 
together with our reinsurance partners and continue to do 
that.168   
 
Again, there is a commitment from the pool over a period of years.  While 
this does not indicate an increase in accommodation, neither does it appear 
there a decrease. 
The senior official with the Idaho Counties Risk Management 
Program, however, indicated there was no need to be more 
accommodating: 
 
We have found our reinsurers being much less demanding 
than ten years ago so we don’t need to accommodate 
much.  I don’t know if this experience is true for other 
                                                                                                                 
167 E-mail from senior official, Ashton Tiffany, LLC, to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 112. 
168 E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 114. 
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pools, however, the current reinsurance market seems 
much less interested in understanding our operations than 
10 years ago.  I believe reinsurance underwriters today 
focus more on loss experience and exposure data and less 
on the personnel and perceived operational competence of 
the pool than they did a decade ago.  Evidence for this is 
found in the decreasing frequency of personal meetings we 
have with the markets and the lack of inquiry into anything 
other than loss runs and exposure data.169 
 
This official’s experience may be an anomaly, or may be that his 
pool has run so well that the reinsurer feels no need for greater 
involvement. 
The former senior official with the Washington Schools Risk 
Management Pool gives his view on accommodation to reinsurers, 
regardless of their influence: 
 
Pools more accommodating to reinsurers . . . I know we 
haven’t.  We left [our previous reinsurer] because they 
started writing our competition.  I told them to choose—us 
or them, so they chose them and we did not renew.  If 
anything, our current reinsurer . . . has been 
accommodating to us, seeking our input on head 
concussion claims, asking what resources they can provide 
to assist us, and taking part in our annual meetings .    [As 
to reinsurers writing our competition,] I view it as an arms 
dealer who supplies both sides of the war.  I do not want 
my claims/underwriting information leaked out to the other 
side and I don’t trust a vendor who doesn’t see a conflict.  I 
also want to maintain a competitive edge, so I want my 
vendor to give me something the other [pool] can’t.  The 
question I’ve asked myself is, at what point does this 
become meaningless—do I stop shopping at Wal-Mart just 
because my competition shops there?170 
 
                                                                                                                 
169 E-mail from senior official, ICRMP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra 
note 116. 
170 E-mails from former senior official, Wash. Sch. Risk Mgmt. Pool, to 
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 129. 
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While this official feels that he has limited his accommodation to the point 
of even terminating a reinsurance relationship, we will see later on that he 
also strongly believes in the relationship, which may be why he ultimately 
terminated his reinsurer. 
The senior official with the Park District Risk Management 
Agency did not feel that pools were more accommodating or less 
accommodating in the last ten years, but felt there was a continued level of 
accommodation.  He stated: 
 
I have only been actively involved in placing the 
reinsurance for the past 8 years and I haven’t seen a 
significant change in the time frame at PDRMA.  I think 
we have been relatively accommodating/receptive to the 
reinsurers input and made changes suggested, both because 
it is useful and because it makes us more attractive to the 
reinsurers.  Two specific examples:  Three years ago we 
undertook a significant project to identify all of the land, 
including open undeveloped land, that our members 
own/lease so that we could continue with the pollution 
coverage we offer to the members.  While the program is a 
commercial insurance policy that we purchase on a group 
basis with a high deductible, it is similar in concept to 
reinsurers having influence on the data we collect.  We 
could have continued to procure the coverage without the 
updated information, but there would have likely been 
restrictions on the coverage. 
  
Second example is when skate parks became popular in 
our area about 8-10 years ago, the reinsurers were very 
concerned that we were going to have large influx of 
claims from those parks.  They wanted specific data on 
how many parks were in our membership and how the 
risks were being controlled.  The data was easy to collect 
because we only had a few parks and our loss control staff 
had been working with the members to develop risk 
management guidelines so we had what the reinsurers 
wanted.  Fast forward 10 years, there are very few skate 
park claims and none that have reached the reinsurance 
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layers so this exposure has become a non-issue and the 
reinsurers pay little attention to skate parks now.171 
 
Here, the PDRMA took the necessary steps required for the reinsurance 
underwriting, rather than make it a difficult issue for both parties.  The 
cooperation and transparency paid off for the pool in the end.  Again, while 
there is no mention of increased accommodation, it does not appear it has 
lessened. 
The senior official with the North Carolina School Boards 
Association noted accommodation levels can vary based on circumstances.  
She said:  
 
I think pools are probably more accommodating of 
reinsurers input, if they respect their reinsurer.  I suppose 
that in a circumstance where a pool may have no other 
reinsurance option available, the accommodation of 
reinsurer input is more out of necessity.  Thankfully, that 
has not been our situation over the last 10 years.172  
 
This is another indication of reinsurer long-term relationships being 
worthwhile for both parties. 
A senior official with the Washington State Transit Insurance 
Pool173 felt that, because of the growth of pooling, it was the reinsurers that 
were more accommodating to the pools.  He said: 
 
It is more likely that the reinsurers’ have moved to 
accommodate pooling than the other way around.  More 
than 80% of the public entity market is engaged in some 
pooling relationship.  I’m sure the commercial reinsurers 
realize the significant market pooling is and they need to 
                                                                                                                 
171 E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency, to Assistant 
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 110.    
172 E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 135. 
173 The Washington State Transit Insurance Pool website is available at 
http://www.wstip.org/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
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adjust to our process and mindset more than pooling to 
theirs.174 
 
This official’s perception, that reinsurers have become more 
accommodating to pools, is likely true, based on the desire for greater 
pooling market share discussed previously.  However, this did not directly 
answer if pools, regardless of the reinsurers’ positioning, have become 
more accommodating as well—perhaps a meeting in the middle in this 
case.   
A senior official with the New Hampshire Public Risk 
Management Exchange175 discussed less involvement by their reinsurer, but 
noted their lengthy successful relationship underpinning the views of both 
parties.  This official stated: 
 
Regarding influence, we have not had much involvement 
by our reinsurer, with whom we have had a long-term 
relationship.  Our reinsurer is looking at our losses from a 
different lens than we are. . . . [I] think we have had 
favorable results with our reinsurer from a terms and 
conditions standpoint, so the influence is minimal, other 
than when there is a loss that reaches the reinsurance 
layer.  Then our concern is whether we can reach a 
consensus on the claim with the reinsurer.176 
 
Here, it appears the official feels the current need for accommodation has 
not been at a high level due their favorable results over time. 
The AGRiP senior officials, both current and former, had general 
observations regarding pools being more accommodating in the past ten 
years.  The current senior official stated: 
 
I can’t speak for all pools, but the ones I work with 
certainly have.  I believe pools are better served by 
recognizing that there are partners out there—even for-
                                                                                                                 
174 E-mail from senior official, Wash. State Transit Ins. Pool, to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc. (July 2, 2013, 10:39 AM CST) (on file with author).    
175 The New Hampshire Public Risk Management Exchange website is 
available at http://www.nhprimex.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
176 E-mail from senior official, N.H. Pub. Risk Mgmt. Exch., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc. (July 2, 11:26 AM CST) (on file with author).  
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profit reinsurers!—who have expertise to share, along with 
capital to “rent.”  [As for those pools that have not been as 
accommodating to reinsurers], I believe that some in the 
pooling industry retain a distrust of for profit ‘vendors’ and 
the insurance/reinsurance industry, in particular.  They 
have seen [reinsurers] run from the market, withhold claim 
reimbursements, deny claims, even go under, and the [pool 
executives] get cynical.  Likewise, reinsurers have seen 
some pools hit them with big claims and [drop their 
reinsurance coverage] the next year, or [pools] be less than 
forthcoming and timely with information.  There are 
always examples of bad business practices on both 
reinsurer and pools’ parts.  There are many more examples 
of excellent, long term partnerships; they just don’t garner 
as much attention.177  
 
In other words, the individual cases of lack of faith are the ones that get 
discussed, due to lawsuits and lingering bad feelings, but the ongoing and 
symbiotic relationships do not warrant much discussion individually.  She 
continues: 
 
Yes, I think the influence of all of the service 
providers/partners vary by pool and individuals employed 
by the pools and their willingness to engage with their 
reinsurers as partners.  One of the reasons AGRiP seeks to 
educate pools is so that pools are on a more equal footing 
with their service providers—reinsurers, actuaries, 
auditors—because there is much “art” to managing risk 
and risk financing, and when the pool and the subject 
matter expert partner as ‘peers’ to solve problems, all are 
better served. Some pool managers don’t share this 
perspective; some reinsurance partners don’t embrace it.  
But, in my experience, pool leaders have overall been 
evolving toward a more collaborative operating model with 
their reinsurers (and other partners), and this is a good 
thing.178 
                                                                                                                 
177 E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 120. 
178 Id. 
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This official notes the necessity for pools’ engagement of the reinsurers—
to gain a better understanding of the reinsurance process, and to use pool 
cooperation as leverage for a better reinsurance product.  While she 
mentions being ‘peers,’ the act of engagement brings the influence of the 
reinsurer to a greater level.  Such an engagement, while done in the spirit of 
partnership, appears to be concession to governance.  This official has seen 
why accommodations happen, and why they do not. 
The former senior official of AGRiP opined about accommodation: 
 
There does not seem to be as much of an adversarial 
relationship between pool officials and reinsurers as in the 
first 20 years of pooling.  However, some pools have not 
been as accommodating because they continue to have a 
bad taste in their mouth due to fraudulent reinsurance 
schemes they were placed in or because of reinsurer 
insolvency.  Both sides have matured and developed a 
greater appreciation for their mutually dependent 
relationships. 
 
[Another reason some pools may not have been as 
accommodating to reinsurers, and] I realize this is a broad 
overstatement, but: it seems the greater the influence of 
elected officials over a pool, the greater the pool considers 
its importance and wants to operate like a big fish in a 
small pond.  In reality, all pools are small fish in big 
ponds.  The fewer elected officials involved, the more 
rational the decision-making. But I never SAID this 
[previously]; just theorized about it.179 
 
This official notes why some pools (seemingly in the minority) have not 
been as accommodating, and the reasons seem less than productive.  It does 
appear this official is pointing out both parties must enter into, and 
continue, the relationship in good faith, act rationally based on their 
respective positions, and follow through on their commitments. 
The reinsurer underwriter with GEM, on recent pooling 
accommodation, felt that pools continued to mature with the help of 
                                                                                                                 
179 E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 122. 
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reinsurers, although some continue to resist.  Have pools become more 
accommodating?  The answer, from a reinsurer’s standpoint, was: 
 
Yes.  I have been actively involved in pooling for eight 
years and when I first came within the industry, I was 
amazed at the general naiveté of pools’ financial 
acumen.  Some pools were still community rated by non-
actuarial practitioners.  Some pools felt comfortable 
reserving until their retention and no more.  Some reserved 
on a stair-stepping basis.  These are all simplistic ways to 
deal with risk transfer, but have become antiquated 
practices of recent.  I can’t say it was only reinsurer’s 
influence, but more reinsurers took more pools seriously as 
their operations become more palatable [to reinsurers]. 
  
Some pools remain unfazed (and even annoyed) at 
reinsurer’s ‘suggestions.’  These fiercely independent 
pools and pool leaders are clinging on to the purity of 
pooling back 20-30 years ago.  Fortunately for [those 
particular] pool[s] and [their] members, 20 to 30 years of 
success permit the incontrovertible argument against fixing 
something that isn’t broken.180 
 
Of course, the objective of regulation is to ensure solvency 
(which can never be guaranteed, regardless of the level or 
type of regulation), and these ‘pure’ pools are 
solvent.  They continue to serve their public entity 
members in the best possible way.  And, neither the added 
cost of government controlled regulation, nor the 
‘suggestions’ of the reinsurers, are changing the level of 
risk the pool presents to the consumer.181 
 
                                                                                                                 
180 Of course, lucky is not an excuse for a lack of objectivity and business 
prudence.  As F. Scott Fitzgerald said, “Nothing is as obnoxious as other people’s 
luck.” Peggy Hayes, Letters to Scottie, Letters to Us, THE MISCELLANY NEWS, Oct. 
2, 1981, at 6. 
181 E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 149. 
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This reinsurer seems to feel that the basis for greater accommodation by 
pools is, through maturation, a greater appreciation by the pools of those 
benefits the reinsurer can bring. 
From the input of the participants documented here, there is 
general agreement that accommodations do exist, even if there is some 
dispute about whether it is increasing or not.  As the GEM underwriter 
previously pointed out, reinsurers need to be careful as to the approaches 
taken pursuing this influence and the desire for pool accommodation, since 
this market is getting more competitive for reinsurers.  It does seem that 
accommodations appear to be a form of voluntarily accepted reinsurer 
governance. 
 
D. DOES REINSURER INFLUENCE VARY ACCORDING TO 
EXTERNAL FACTORS? 
 
Lastly, the evidence showed that reinsurer influence with pools 
varies, as seen in some of the responses.  Financial strength and pool 
sophistication, two elements often intertwined, were the two greatest 
factors that determined the level of reinsurer involvement.  Did these 
officials believe reinsurer influence varied based on factors such as 
financial size or condition, perceived sophistication or experience of the 
pool administrators, or any other factors?  Again, the answers diverged 
somewhat, but seemed to come back to financial strength of the pool as 
being the most specific factor.  Nevertheless, more interesting was the 
officials’ insistence on speaking to the relationship as the intangible factor 
that might be the most determinative of all in the debate regarding 
governance.  
First, the senior official with the Texas Association of School 
Boards, Inc., stated: 
 
I think the influence of the reinsurers varies greatly based 
on the financial condition, size, age, ‘sophistication’ and 
experience of the pool.  The smaller, younger, financially 
weak or more outsourced a pool is, the greater the 
perceived risk for the reinsurer and the greater their 
involvement and imposition of certain requirements.  For 
example, I can’t remember the last time a reinsurer 
imposed or even reviewed . . . who [the TASB Risk 
Management Fund] can write and at what price.  That’s 
because we are very well established, have a proven track 
record and assume a large retention on every risk.  So they 
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tend to leave us alone.  However, if we were new, had an 
unproven track record, weren’t as financially solid, the 
picture would be very different.  The reinsurers would 
impose much greater underwriting and claims oversight 
than they do for us.182 
 
Finances appear to be the pivotal factor as to reinsurer governance, and 
influence seems to vary based on the relative strength of the pool.  Because 
this pool is very substantial in comparison to its exposures, the reinsurers 
have fewer concerns or need for influence. 
The former senior official with the Washington Schools Risk 
Management Pool felt that excellent financial condition of the pool 
lessened influence of the reinsurers: 
 
Influence based on size . . . absolutely; with us self-
insuring the first $1 million and having the surplus to take 
more if necessary, I think we have more options and 
flexibility than a small pool with limited surplus and small 
retention.  I think the Texas Association of School Boards 
has even greater clout with the reinsurance market.183 
 
It appears again that, regardless of the perception of reinsurer influence, 
reinsurers are much more willing to follow the fortunes of a well-managed, 
financially strong pool using less reinsurer influence. 
The senior official with the Maryland Association of Boards of 
Education had similar sentiments about financial strength, but also 
sophistication of the administration: 
 
[The] reinsurer would have a lot more confidence dealing 
with property from a pool that has accurate property values 
vs. a pool that can only estimate its property values.184 And 
a reinsurer is obviously concerned about a pool’s 
                                                                                                                 
182 E-mail from senior official, TASB. Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 105. 
183 E-mail from senior official, Wash. Sch. Risk Mgmt. Pool, to Assistant. 
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 129. 
184 As the senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property & 
Casualty, Inc. discovered, and corrected. E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous. 
Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to  Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 101. 
120  CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 21.1 
 
finances.  They obviously would rather write strong well-
funded pools than those with inadequate reserves and/or 
surplus.  I spoke with one of our reinsurers who advised 
me that our program secured great comparative rates 
because they trusted our submissions knowing our 
representations of data, claims and resources were accurate 
and our financial position was strong.185  
 
Again, finances, along with trust of the pool’s representations, lessened the 
amount of reinsurance governance necessary.  Reinsurers have a larger 
degree of faith and certainty in pools operating at a high level.  This trust 
comes from the pool’s transparency. 
The senior official for the Arizona Risk Retention Trust, Inc., said 
that the factors leading to a well-established pool lessened the influence of 
the reinsurer: 
 
Yes, the less mature pools may feel they are inexperienced 
and look to the reinsurer for guidance and advice.  The less 
mature pools may also be less attractive to the reinsurers 
because of the lack of stability and the financial strength of 
a more mature pool.  The more mature pools may be less 
influenced by the reinsurer, but may have strong working 
relationships with them which help keep the pool strong 
and attractive to other [re]insurers.186 
 
This is another example of the inverse relationship between pool strength 
and reinsurance governance.  The stronger the pool, the less the reinsurer is 
able, or needs to, influence the pool. 
The senior official with the Montana School Group Insurance 
Authority continued on the same theme of reinsurance influence waning as 
the pools financial strength grew.  Can reinsurer influence vary? 
 
Yes again.  Size does matter with regard to the primary 
pool level.  The large pools usually have greater depth and 
put more primary pool effort into the reinsurance 
                                                                                                                 
185 E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 114. 
186 E-mail from senior official, Ashton Tiffany, LLC, to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 112. 
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submission process.  While smaller pools rely to a greater 
extent on the assistance provide by the insurance 
placement brokerage firm staff for the best items to include 
[as well as] how to organize the information for the 
reinsurance carrier.  Many brokers will actually ‘pretty up’ 
the raw data from the smaller primary pool and provide a 
more organized package or submission for the reinsurance 
carrier on behalf of their [small pool] client. 
   
[However], the larger pools often . . . need access to certain 
reinsurance markets because of specialty risks they need to 
insure such as Tier 1 wind,187 Flood zone A188 & V,189 or 
just the raw size of their program limit needed.  Thus, not 
just any reinsurance carrier is going to do, so the 
[reinsurance] influence, although still indirect, is more 
present than ever given the factor of primary pool size.190 
 
This official points out an interesting diminishing returns dilemma for 
successful pools.  If a pool is successful and needs a reinsurer willing to 
reinsure large amounts, or a pool specializes in a niche market (which 
many governmental entity pools inherently must), the market for 
reinsurance products actually decreases.  This can result in the increased 
influence of the remaining reinsurers on such pools; a greater level of 
governance because of the increased or unusual exposures and limited 
selection of reinsurers. 
                                                                                                                 
187 Those coastal areas are prone to windstorms and hurricanes, thus 
specialized coverage is needed. For example, in Texas these coastal areas are listed 
in TEX. INS. CODE § 2210.003(4) (West 2009). 
188 Areas subject to inundation by the one-percent-annual-chance flood event 
generally determined using approximate methodologies. Zone A, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/floodplain-management/zone#0 (last 
visited Dec, 27, 2014). 
189 Areas along coasts subject to inundation by the one-percent-annual-chance 
of flood event with additional hazards associated with storm-induced waves. Zone 
V, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-
insurance-program-2/zone-v#0 (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
190 E-mail from senior official, Mont. Sch. Grp. Ins. Auth., to Assistant. Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 132. 
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The senior official with the Idaho Counties Risk Management 
Program felt that while reinsurers do exert more or less influence based on 
varying pool factors, other external factors played a role as well: 
 
I do believe reinsurers are influenced [by financial size or 
condition, perceived sophistication or experience of the 
pool administrators].  However, reinsurance markets 
continue to be driven by financial modeling and national 
and international corporate strategy rather than by personal 
perception of individual pools.  Allianz191 provided a large 
and popular property market for pools until three years 
ago.  ICRMP had been a client for 10 years and was 
extremely profitable.  Allianz’s corporate strategy was to 
exit the public entity market place and resulted in a large 
number of pools changing property markets.  Allianz’s 
decision is an example of a global corporation’s market 
strategy taking precedent over the local underwriter’s 
impressions of an individual pool.192 
 
This official’s experience was that the pooling market was still not large 
enough to make an overall impression on large reinsurers.  However, it 
appears other reinsurers are taking their place, as the GEM reinsurer 
underwriter indicated. 
The senior official with the County Commissioners Association of 
Pennsylvania took a more relationship-centric view to the question 
regarding various factors affecting influence, and this became a trend in the 
responses: 
 
I think it [is] more about the philosophy of the 
management of the pool.  This includes the [pool’s] board 
but I would say it is as much about the pool’s staff.  If the 
pool’s staff believes reinsurance is just a mere commodity, 
then the relationship will be very different and can even be 
combative.  If the relationship is collaborative, even a 
rough claims issue can be resolved.  We did have one bad 
                                                                                                                 
191 See generally Property Insurance, ALLIANZ GLOBAL CORP. & SPECIALTY, 
http://www.agcs.allianz.com/services/property/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
192 E-mail from senior official, ICRMP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra 
note 116.    
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situation with a reinsurer who abandoned us because of our 
[then] financial condition (which is much stronger now).  
They were new to our pool and did not want to invest the 
time to see if we would turn the finances around.193 
 
Notice the term “commodity” arose, as a definite negative to a pool.  It is 
apparent to this official that the more reinsurance is a commodity for a 
pool, for whatever reason, the less beneficial the relationship is for the 
pool, and the less good faith is shown by all. 
The senior official with the Park District Risk Management 
Agency noted: 
 
I do think perceived sophistication/experience and 
financial conditions can influence a reinsurers’ view of a 
specific pool.  The reinsurers regularly review our 
financials as part of the annual renewal process and they 
want to know details about any changes.  A pool that 
significantly under prices exposures for the members may 
create additional risks for the reinsurers.194 
 
In other words, if a reinsurer believes a pool is underpricing its coverage, 
the reinsurer will charge higher premiums or may walk away altogether.  
Under-pricing exposures is very detrimental to the creation and 
maintenance of an atmosphere of utmost good faith, and makes it 
extremely difficult for a reinsurer to willingly follow the fortunes of the 
pool.  More sophisticated pools are better able to price their exposures 
accurately. 
The former senior official of AGRiP had comments that are more 
general: 
 
Yes, just as with other insurers or in any other business 
relationship where there are degrees of separation between 
“size, perceived sophistication [and] experience, financial 
condition or other factors” between the parties.  But 
reinsurers, as a general proposition, are seeking long-term 
                                                                                                                 
193 E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 107. 
194 E-mail from senior official, Park Dist. Risk Mgmt. Agency, to Assistant 
Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 110.  
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financial success, not just one profitable year at the 
expense of their clients.195 
 
This official notes that while all of those factors are important, the 
reinsurers generally do not want a one-term relationship.  It appears this is 
much like gambling—reinsurers have to win over time; otherwise, they are 
dependent upon quick strike luck at pools’ expense, and will soon run out 
of willing clients.  The relationship aspect matters most, regardless of what 
factors drive it and how much governance is necessary. 
The underwriter from the reinsurer GEM had this to say—and note 
his use of the term ‘symbiotic relationships,’ which is mentioned 
unprompted more than once by various pooling officials: 
 
GEM is in a unique position on this, since we are owned 
by pools.  Our best interest is our pools best interest, and 
vice versa.  I think a reinsurer’s influence does vary, 
somewhat based on the items you list, but also based on 
the reinsured’s acceptance of “advice.”  Because 
reinsurance as a regulator is de facto at best, without legal 
authority or mandatory regulations, the reinsured needs to 
both accept and value the suggestions made by the 
reinsurer.  This type of trust is built either by mutual 
interested (such as with GEM), or long-term symbiotic 
relationships (as with other commercial reinsurers).196 
 
This reinsurance underwriter encapsulates much of the theory of this 
paper—the cedent has no statutory obligation but willingly accepts 
operational governing parameters to obtain a product.  This governance is 
best appreciated and grown through long-term symbiotic relationships. 
The senior official with the Washington State Transit Insurance 
Pool continued the symbiotic theme, mentioning the need for these solid 
relationships, regardless of his feelings on influence: 
 
The questions on the relationship of a reinsurer to the 
conduct of our pool are mutual.  Before we would even 
                                                                                                                 
195 E-mail from former senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB., Inc. 
(July 11, 2013, 12:07 PM). 
196 E-mail from reinsurance underwriter, GEM, Inc., to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 149. 
2014 REINSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 125 
 
entertain the prospect of any engagement we’d make sure 
they know our business, they are comfortable with our best 
practices and claims handling and final they share our long 
term vision. 
 
Pooling as a whole is finally beginning to ideologically 
move from the mindset of a ‘country-club attitude’ to a 
small mutual insurance enterprise.  Pools relationship to 
the mutual insurance world is no different than a credit 
union is to being a bank. 
 
Our business is one of relationships.  Pools need to foster a 
cohesive, professional and mutual understanding with their 
respective partners including reinsurers, captives and 
excess markets.197 
 
This is another relationship-centric focused comment that indicates the 
governance is beyond any one factor of reinsurer influence. 
 The senior official with the New Hampshire Public Risk 
Management Exchange emphasized reinsurer relationships as well: 
 
As to the relationship between reinsurers and pools, it is 
critical.  It is critical for the reinsurer to know the pool is 
proactive in risk management and claims mitigation, and 
that the pool has the appropriate expertise on staff to deal 
with that.  I think there is work by the claim staff that can 
be done to keep the loss from ever getting into the 
reinsurance layer, so staff expertise and skill level is 
important to reinsurers.  From the pool’s perspective, it is 
vital the reinsurer understands the unique nature of public 
entity pooling and the unique exposures that come with 
that.  The relationship has to be symbiotic, as this is 
important to enable both parties to succeed.198 
 
                                                                                                                 
197 E-mail from senior official, Wash. State Transit Ins. Pool, to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 174. 
198 E-mail from senior official, N.H. Pub. Risk Mgmt. Exch., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 176. 
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There is striking continuity in this relationship theme.  This official feels 
that symbiosis is critical for success. 
The senior official with the North Carolina School Boards 
Association felt strongly as well about the relationship aspect: 
 
I think it is helpful to have the reinsurer as a resource of 
information and to use as a guide in deciding which 
direction a pool might go with certain programs, if the pool 
respects the reinsurer and its staff.  For example, this year 
we engaged our reinsurer in discussions about how our 
pool planned to address the issue of law enforcement 
liability coverage for our members.  Of course, a topic such 
as this has direct implications on the reinsurer, depending 
on how the coverage is written, and having them involved 
in the discussion from the beginning was good for 
everyone.  If the mutual respect/positive relationship does 
not exist between the reinsurer and the pool, then it is 
difficult to move forward as a team in planning which way 
a pool program may decide to go.199 
 
The senior official with the Missouri Housing Authorities Property 
and Casualty, Inc., echoed the same sentiments about the pool-reinsurer 
relationship: 
 
The pool-reinsurer relationship is a valuable and necessary 
partnership.  I believe that good and timely 
communication, together with consistency in the handling 
of claims is key to negotiating the optimal arrangement for 
future years.  Relationships matter a lot.200 
 
The current senior official with AGRIP felt that reinsurers gaining 
a greater understanding of pooling was a key factor—but it often depended 
on the underwriters: 
 
                                                                                                                 
199 E-mail from senior official, N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, to Assistant Dir., TASB, 
Inc., supra note 135.   
200 E-mail from senior official, Mo. Hous. Auths. Prop. & Cas., Inc., to  
Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., supra note 101. 
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It depends on the individual [underwriter], more than the 
reinsurance company.  Some individual underwriters at 
reinsurers that have developed a real understanding of 
pools with tell you they truly prefer pool partners than 
other insurance companies.  They embrace the mission-
driven risk control purpose.  They appreciate the stability 
of the pool’s book of business. But underwriters with no 
such experience really don’t know there is a difference.  I 
don’t mean to sound philosophical, but I truly believe that 
pooling, done right, is a different animal—a different 
paradigm—than insurance.  There are underwriters that 
specialize in pools at a variety of reinsurers who ‘get this’, 
and sell [their] senior management on this [concept].  But, 
that doesn’t mean the reinsurance company as a whole 
prefers pools to insurers; they are just two separate client 
groups.201 
 
Much like the operation of GEM, which is a reinsurer owned by its 
member pools, the senior official with the County Commissioners 
Association of Pennsylvania mentioned his own captive reinsurer,202 a 
system that creates and encourages the long-standing relationships: 
 
We are members of one of our reinsurers – County 
Reinsurance Limited (CRL).  Two of our pools work with 
CRL for coverage (work comp and liability).  CRL is a 
Vermont based captive owned by the county pools, which 
are reinsured by it.  This is the next step in pooling, 
gaining greater control and specificity of knowledge about 
our exposures.  This is working exceedingly well for us.203 
 
                                                                                                                 
201 E-mail from current senior official, AGRiP, to Assistant Dir., TASB, Inc., 
supra note 120. 
202 See generally Donald J. Riggin, Things to Know about Captive Insurance 
Companies, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST. (Nov. 2008), 
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2008/riggin11-risk-finance-captives.aspx.  
203 E-mail from senior official, Cnty. Comm’rs Ass’n of Pa., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 107. 
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While the senior official with the Maryland Association of School 
Boards previously mentioned he did not feel there was much in the way of 
influence by reinsurers, he felt the relationship aspect was necessary: 
 
[F]or us, working with reinsurers is just like working with 
other vendors.  Trust, transparency and diligence go a long 
way to creating a positive mutually beneficial 
relationship.204  
 
 The senior official with the New Hampshire Public Risk 
Management Exchange probably capped this discussion most succinctly: 
 
We need reinsurance.  We need that level of protection.  Its 
whether or not the reinsurers will see the opportunity, with 
what is happening in the market, to stay competitive with 
small to medium sized risks, like pools.205 
 
Towards the end in this last sub-Part, the officials’ thoughts were 
left without this author’s comment, as they seemed to speak for themselves.  
As can be seen, even though the question presented to the officials involved 
factors that might vary influence (and thus governance), most redirected 
back to, and passionately argued for, the need for symbiotic relationships 
over the long-term.  Without these close relationships, it appears, reinsurers 
would have no influence (other than purely contractual) for governance to 
protect their exposures, and pools would have little incentive to 




Based on this research, it seems clear there is a form of reinsurance 
influence or ‘governance,’ in the largely unregulated world of self-insured 
pools, and it seems to manifest itself mostly in underwriting and claim 
reinsurer influence.  Rather than state regulation, which takes the all too 
familiar form of statutes, administrative regulations, and litigation, this 
‘governance’ imposed by reinsurers is centered on relationships and the 
                                                                                                                 
204 E-mail from senior official, Md. Ass’n of Bds. of Educ., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 114. 
205 E-mail from senior official, N.H. Pub. Risk Mgmt. Exch., to Assistant Dir., 
TASB, Inc., supra note 176. 
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business needs of both parties.  Pools are free to unburden themselves from 
any oversight or influence by reinsurers, and reinsurers are free to not 
accept pools’ risks.  Nevertheless, in both doing so, pools lose the 
opportunity to rent capital to expand their market share or limit risk, and 
reinsurers lose premium dollars and their own market share. 
While some pools feel reinsurers have no real impact, and perhaps 
some reinsurers might feel they have great control, the reality for both lies 
more towards the middle.  Depending on the pool, the advantage is more 
likely towards the reinsurer, or, when dealing with experienced and well-
funded pools, perhaps more towards equilibrium.  Reinsurers currently do 
not conduct business with pools with a stick, but a carrot—the promise of 
lower rates and/or more favorable terms if the pools concede to certain 
reinsurer input or improve transparency.  Thus, as many above have put it, 
the reinsurer is essentially given influence on the process by the pools.  All 
pools want lower reinsurance rates to help lower the overall cost to their 
members.  In order to obtain this benefit, the pools willingly accept 
reinsurer’s governance to gain the advantages possible in the relationship. 
Moreover, by pools giving this influence to their long-term partner 
reinsurers, this author argues the governance effect is not necessarily 
‘silent’ as Professor Abramovsky labels it, at least in the pooling segment, 
but an open and recognized influence.  Because this concept of ‘agreed-
upon governance’ between cedents and reinsurers is a fairly new one, or at 
least not well documented, it may be that more pools and reinsurers will 
have different perspectives on the relationship as time goes on.  Even the 
term ‘influence’ seems to mean different things to these diverse entities.  
What one pool views as ordinary underwriting requests by reinsurers might 
be viewed by another pool as overreaching and burdensome, much in the 
way some people have varying views of taxation.   
However, it appears from this research there is a reinsurer 
‘governance effect’ on pools in this relationship.  Since the behavior of the 
pool changes based on the relationship, the degree of adjustment does not 
matter for the effect to cross the line into apparent governance, however 
mild.  While there may be a contractual agreement in place among the 
parties, that cannot change the fact that, if reinsurance was always available 
and at a set price, pools would likely not alter their behavior, unless forced 
to do so by other internal or market conditions.  Since the majority of 
pooling officials noted underwriting and claims accommodations, it 
certainly appears they agree that a form of governance is present, whether 
they wish to characterize it that way themselves or not. 
Therefore, even if pools would prefer not to call it ‘regulation’ as it 
makes them think of state administrative regulation and all its negative 
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implications, this governance effect, even if very subtle compared to state 
regulation, is there.  Reinsurers do shape the approach, to varying degrees, of 
how most pools operate. 
This reinsurance influence does not have to be antagonistic, and as 
most survey participants agreed, is not.  As the pooling officials admitted, 
they willingly agreed on some issues or bore the expense of more 
transparency since it helped them run a better business and gain the financial 
and marketing advantages of reinsurance.  The opportunity of reinsurance 
gives the pools the flexibility to write new markets or expand current ones, 
limit risk and gain market knowledge—opportunities that might not have 
otherwise arisen had the pool not engaged in the reinsurance process.  
The more interesting finding was the utmost good faith aspect that 
almost seemed inherent with this segment of the market.  While other 
sectors of reinsurance may indeed be moving away from this concept and 
focusing on arms-length transactions, pooling seems to be going the 
opposite direction by embracing the relationship.  From this admittedly 
small sample of the approximately 500 pools currently operating in the 
United States, it appears that, rather than becoming a commodity to each 
other, reinsurers and pools are engaging the strengths of each and forging 
long-term business bonds. 
This adherence to the concept of utmost good faith through symbiotic 
relationships appears to arise inherently here, and, to this author, is the more 
important finding.  This research did not set out to show whether utmost good 
faith was still abundant; however, the discovery of this is a satisfying 
underpinning to the main point of reinsurer influence.  Does reinsurer 
governance arise because the concept of utmost good faith is adhered to by 
the pools, or does inherent reinsurer influence force the concept of utmost 
good faith onto the pools?  In the end, it is neither.  Pools allow the reinsurer 
to have influence to the extent necessary in order to obtain the best product 
and service possible for their members, and pools embrace utmost good faith 
because it is the most efficient route to that end in the long term.   
Based on this research, these industry professionals outline the 
influence of reinsurers on pools, and the governance that arises from this 
influence.  This regulatory influence, hypothesized by Professor Abramovsky, 
is demonstrated by this research.  This reinsurer governance, whether 
characterized as direct or indirect, or regulatory or not in nature, is governance 
(‘sway’, as the governance definition also called it) accepted by the pools.  
This acceptance, shown in the form of utmost good faith by the pools, results 
in utmost good faith being returned by the reinsurers.  These interdependent 
experiences strengthen the relationship, and the prospects, for both cedent and 
reinsurer, and are possible because of reinsurer governance. 




A. INITIAL QUESTIONS TO POOL OFFICIALS 
 
1. Do you think pools are influenced by reinsurers?  If so, 
does this influence get into operational level matters affecting employees 
conduct, such as reinsurer suggestions on claim procedures, coverage issue 
handling, or authority—can you give any specific examples?  If it is 
general influence rather than specific, such as what coverages to offer or 
underwriting criteria, can you give examples of that?   
2. Do you think pools have become more accommodating in 
the past 10 years to reinsurers’ input, either because the input is helpful or 
because it is necessary to make the pool more attractive to insurers?  Or for 
any other reason? 
3. Do you think reinsurers’ influence on individual pools can 
vary based on factors such as the size of the pool, perceived 
sophistication/experience, financial condition or other factors? 
4. Any other comments about the pool—reinsurer 
relationship from your experience? 
 
B. INITIAL QUESTIONS TO AGRIP OFFICIALS 
 
Assuming that reinsurance is a vital component of most pools’ 
financial viability: 
1. Do you believe pools have practices or operational 
procedures in place as a result of suggestions or requirements from 
reinsurers?  Or, in other words, do you think pools believe they are directly 
or indirectly “regulated” in a fashion or largely influenced by their 
reinsurers’ underwriting and examination of their operations? 
2. If not, do you think pools believe their inherent financial 
viability requires them to focus on internal procedures (or to self-regulate 
without insurance department oversight), or is it more about their fiduciary 
and contractual obligations to members, rather than the influence of 
reinsurance?  Or is it another reason? 
3. As to the type of reinsurance typically taken out by pools, 
do you see most pools taking out treaty reinsurance or facultative 
reinsurance?  More importantly, do you think most pools take out excess of 
loss reinsurance versus proportional reinsurance?  I have a feeling pools are 
generally like the TASB Fund, with treaty reinsurance/excess of loss 
reinsurance. 
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4. I am very interested in your thoughts into those examples 
of pools attempting to be more attractive to reinsurers, and the subtle 
influence of reinsurers suggestions, regarding loss control requirements, 
claim management procedures and coverage issues.  Specifically, I am 
interested in how reinsurers input affects the actual conduct of pool/TPA 
personnel.  I am trying to nail down if reinsurers give general input, or does 
it tend to be more specific on the operational level?  Additionally, what 
kinds of examples have you seen as it relates to claim management or 
coverage issues?  Did reinsurers make suggestions generally about claim 
management focus, or was it more specific as to daily operations, structure, 
caseloads, or authority?  As to coverage, were the suggestions more general 
in nature, such as types of coverage offered, or more specific/operational, 
such as suggestions on coverage question investigations or coverage 
decisions?  Any examples of reinsurer influence you can give me that 
affect a large number of pools would be helpful. 
5. Do you feel that pools have generally become more 
accommodating in the past decade to reinsurers input, either because the 
input is helpful or because of the attempt to make the pool attractive to 
reinsurers? 
6. For any pools that have not been as accommodating, do 
you have any thoughts as to why, and do you think these pools are limiting 
their ability to grow (with the lack of capacity/capital)? 
7. Do you think reinsurers currently feel more of a 
partnership with pools versus insurers, or is it just different? 
 
C. QUESTIONS TO REINSURANCE UNDERWRITER 
 
1. Do you believe pools have practices or operational 
procedures in place as a result of suggestions or requirements from 
reinsurers?  Or, in other words, do you think pools are directly or indirectly 
“regulated” in a fashion or largely influenced by their reinsurers’ 
underwriting and examination of their operations? 
2. Do reinsurers believe they directly or indirectly regulate or 
largely influence pools’ behavior through underwriting and operations 
reviews, more so than standard primary carriers? 
3. If so, do reinsurers believe this influence is necessary 
because of the limited regulation or unregulated nature of pools?  And is it 
more about pools’ financial stability or operational ability, or other factors? 
4. If not, do reinsurers just feel pools are a risk like any other 
carrier, with inherent strengths and weaknesses? 
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5. Overall, do reinsurers support pools’ efforts to remain 
outside of governmental regulation, and why? 
6. As to the type of reinsurance typically taken out by pools, 
do you see most pools taking out treaty reinsurance or facultative 
reinsurance?  More importantly, do you think most pools take out excess-
of-loss reinsurance versus proportional reinsurance?  I have a feeling pools 
are generally like the TASB Fund, with treaty reinsurance/excess of loss 
reinsurance. 
7. I am very interested in your thoughts into those examples 
of indirect influence on pools by reinsurers’ suggestions.  Some areas of 
influence might be loss control requirements, claim management 
procedures and coverage offerings/issues.  Specifically, I am interested in 
how reinsurers input affects the actual conduct of pool/TPA personnel.  I 
am trying to nail down if reinsurers give general input, or does it tend to be 
more specific on the operational level?  Can you give me examples of how 
reinsurers have tried to affect pools’ behavior?  Any examples of influence 
that affects the majority of pools would be helpful. 
8. Do you feel that pools have generally become more 
accommodating in the past decade to reinsurers input, either because the 
input is helpful or because of the attempt to make the pool attractive to 
reinsurers?   
9. For any pools that have not been as accommodating, do 
you have any thoughts as to why, and do you think these pools are limiting 
their ability to grow (with the lack of capacity/capital)?  Or less 
accommodating because reinsurers are more interested lately in the public 
entity pooling market, and pools don’t have to work as hard to find 
reinsurance? 
10. As reinsurers gain a greater understanding of pools—
reduction of risk versus underwriting profit—do you think reinsurers 
currently feel more of a partnership with pools versus insurers, or is it just 
different? 
11. Why do you believe there has been renewed interest by 
reinsurers in writing pools? 
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D. SAMPLE INTERLOCAL PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT 
 
TASB RISK MANAGEMENT FUND 
INTERLOCAL PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT 
Pursuant to the Texas Interlocal Cooperation Act, Chapter 791 of the 
Texas Government Code, this Interlocal Participation Agreement 
(Agreement) is entered into by and between the Texas Association of 
School Boards Risk Management Fund (Fund) and the undersigned 
local government of the State of Texas (Fund Member). The Fund is 
an administrative agency of local governments (Fund Members) that 
cooperate in performing administrative services and governmental 
functions relative to risk management.  
 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
 
In consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions contained in 
this Agreement and other good and valuable consideration, 
including, without limitation, the agreement of the Fund and Fund 
Members to provide risk management programs as detailed in this 
Agreement, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby 
acknowledged, Fund Member and the Fund, intending to be legally 
bound, and subject to the terms, conditions, and provisions of this 
Agreement, agree as follows: 
 
1. Authority. Fund Member hereby approves and adopts the 
Restatement of Interlocal Agreement, dated May 20, 1997, 
which restated the Interlocal Agreement dated July 2, 1974, 
establishing the predecessor of the Fund. The Restatement of 
Interlocal Agreement is incorporated into this Agreement by 
reference and is available from the Fund upon request. This 
Agreement serves to outline the relationship between the Fund 
and Fund Member. While the Texas Interlocal Cooperation Act 
provides the overarching basis for the Fund, certain Fund 
programs are further authorized pursuant to various statutes, 
such as Chapter 205 of the Texas Labor Code, pertaining to 
unemployment compensation; Chapter 504 of the Texas Labor 
Code, pertaining to workers’ compensation; and Chapter 2259, 
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Subchapter B, of the Texas Government Code, pertaining to 
other risks or hazards.  
 
2. Program Participation. This Agreement enables Fund 
Member to participate in one or more of the Fund’s available 
programs, including but not limited to, property, liability, auto, 
workers’ compensation, and unemployment compensation 
coverage. Because this is an enabling Agreement, Fund 
Member must also execute a separate Contribution and 
Coverage Summary (CCS) for each Fund program from which 
it seeks coverage and/or administrative services. Only a valid 
CCS will confer the right to participate in a specific program 
and each CCS shall be incorporated into this Agreement. 
Through participation in any Fund program, Fund Member 
waives none of its immunities and authorizes the Fund, or its 
designee, to assert such immunities on its behalf and on behalf 
of the Fund or its designee.  
 
3. Term of Agreement. This Agreement shall be effective from 
the date of the last signature below and shall remain in effect 
unless terminated as provided in this Agreement. This 
Agreement will automatically terminate if Fund Member 
ceases to participate in at least one of the Fund’s programs (due 
to the expiration of a CCS participation term or the valid 
termination of same) or fails to meet the membership 
qualifications of the Fund as provided in this Agreement and as 
determined by the Fund in writing.  
 
4. Termination. Unless this Agreement is automatically 
terminated as described above, this Agreement, and/or any 
component CCS applicable to Fund Member, can be terminated 
as set forth below. However, the termination of any single Fund 
program under a CCS shall not also result in the automatic 
termination of another pending CCS, or this enabling 
Agreement if any other CCS is still in force for Fund Member. 
Rather, each Fund program can only be terminated as provided 
in this Agreement. 
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a. By Either Party with 30 Days Notice before Renewal. 
Any CCS may be terminated by either party with 
termination to be effective on any successive renewal 
date by giving written notice to the other party no later 
than 30 days prior to automatic renewal. 
 
b. By Fund Member upon Payment of Late Notice Fee. If 
Fund Member fails to terminate a CCS as provided 
above, it may still terminate participation in any Fund 
program prior to the renewal date by paying a late notice 
fee as herein provided. If Fund Member terminates the 
CCS before the renewal date, but with fewer than 30 
days’ advance written notice, Fund Member agrees to pay 
the Fund a late notice fee in the amount of 25% of the 
annual contribution for the expiring participation term. 
Fund Member expressly acknowledges that the late notice 
fee is not a penalty, but a reasonable approximation of the 
Fund’s damages for the Fund Member’s untimely 
withdrawal from the program identified in the CCS. 
However, once the renewal term of a CCS commences, 
Fund Member can no longer terminate the CCS by paying 
a late notice fee; the CCS shall renew and Fund Member 
shall be bound thereby.  
 
c. By the Fund upon Breach by Fund Member.  
 
1) The Fund may terminate this Agreement or any CCS 
based on breach of any of the following obligations, 
by giving 10 days’ written notice to Fund Member of 
the breach; and Fund Member’s failure to cure the 
breach within said 10 days (or other time period 
allowed by the Fund): 
 
2) Fund Member fails or refuses to make the payments 
or contributions required by this Agreement;   
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3) Fund Member fails to cooperate and comply with any 
reasonable requests for information and/or records 
made by the Fund;  
 
4) Fund Member fails or refuses to follow loss 
prevention or statutory compliance requirements of 
the Fund, as provided in this Agreement; or 
 
5) Fund Member otherwise breaches this Agreement.  
 
If the Fund terminates this Agreement, or any CCS, based on 
breach as described above, Fund Member agrees that the Fund 
will have no responsibility of any kind or nature to provide 
coverage on the terminated Fund program post-termination. 
Further, Fund Member shall bear the full financial responsibility 
for any unpaid open claim and expense related to any claim, 
asserted or unasserted and reported or unreported, against the 
Fund or Fund Member, or incurred by the agents or 
representatives of Fund Member.  
 
In addition to the foregoing, if termination is due to Fund 
Member’s failure to make required payments or contributions, 
Fund Member agrees that it shall pay the Fund liquidated 
damages in the amount of 50% of the annual contribution for the 
participation term identified in the terminated CCS.  
 
5. Contributions.  
 
a. Agreement to Pay. Fund Member agrees to pay its 
contribution for each Fund program in which it 
participates based on a plan developed by the Fund. The 
amount of contribution will be stated in the relevant CCS 
and will be payable upon receipt of an invoice from the 
Fund. Late fees amounting to the maximum interest 
allowed by law, but not less than the rate of interest 
authorized under Chapter 2251, Texas Government Code, 
shall begin to accrue daily on the first day following the 
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due date and continue until the contribution and late fees 
are paid in full. If Fund Member owes the Fund payments 
under this Agreement, including any CCS, the Fund may 
offset such amounts from any Fund Member funds held 
by the Fund, regardless of program. 
 
b. Estimated Contribution. In specified situations, the 
amount of contribution shown in the CCS will be 
identified as an estimate. The Fund reserves the right to 
request an audit of updated exposure information at the 
end of the CCS participation term and adjust 
contributions if Fund Member’s exposure changes during 
the CCS participation term. As a result of the exposure 
review, any additional contribution payable to the Fund 
shall be paid by Fund Member, and any overpayment of 
contribution by Fund Member shall be returned by the 
Fund. The Fund reserves the right to audit the relevant 
records of Fund Member in order to conduct this 
exposure review. 
 
 Upon expiration of each participation period, Fund 
Member may request a contribution adjustment due to 
exposure changes. Such request must be made in writing 
within 60 days after the end of the participation period. 
Fund Member must provide documentation as requested 
by the Fund to demonstrate that the exposure change 
warrants a contribution adjustment. 
 
c. Contribution Adjustment. Should the Fund’s 
underwriting income for any program within a given 
program year be inadequate to pay the ultimate cost of 
claims incurred for that year, the Fund may collect an 
adjusted contribution from any current or former Fund 
Member if that Fund Member’s contribution is 
inadequate to pay the Fund Member’s claims incurred 
during that year.   
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6. Contribution and Coverage Summary. Fund Member agrees 
to abide by each CCS that governs its participation. A CCS will 
incorporate the program specific coverage document, if any, 
which sets forth the scope of coverage and/or services from the 
Fund. A CCS for a Fund program will state the participation 
term. After Fund Member’s initial execution of a CCS, the 
CCS will automatically renew annually, unless terminated in 
accordance with this Agreement. Any renewal containing a 
change in the amount of contribution or other terms will be 
subject to the Amendment by Notice process described in this 
Agreement.  
 
7. Loss Prevention. The Fund may provide loss prevention 
services to Fund Member. Fund Member agrees to adopt the 
Fund’s reasonable and customary standards for loss prevention 
and to cooperate in implementing any and all reasonable loss 
prevention and statutory compliance recommendations or 
requirements.  
 
8. Other Duties of Fund Member.  
 
a. Standards of Performance. Time shall be of the essence 
in Fund Member’s reporting of any and all claims to the 
Fund, payment of any contributions or monies due to the 
Fund, and delivery of any written notices under this 
Agreement.  
 
b. Claims Reporting. Notice of any claim must be provided 
to the Fund no more than 30 days after Fund Member 
knows or should have known of the claim or 
circumstances leading to the claim, unless a different 
reporting requirement is required by law or provided for 
in the CCS. Failure by Fund Member to timely report a 
claim may result in denial of coverage or payment of 
fines or penalties imposed by law or regulatory agencies. 
If the Fund advances payment of any fine or penalty 
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arising from Fund Member’s late claim reporting, Fund 
Member will reimburse the Fund for all such costs.  
 
9. Administration of Claims. The Fund or its designee agrees to 
administer all claims for which Fund Member has coverage 
after Fund Member provides timely written notice to the Fund. 
Fund Member hereby authorizes the Fund or its designee to act 
in all matters pertaining to handling of claims for which Fund 
Member has coverage pursuant to this Agreement. Fund 
Member expressly agrees that the Fund has sole authority in all 
matters pertaining to the administration of claims and grants 
the Fund or its designee full decision-making authority in all 
matters, including without limitation, discussions with 
claimants and their attorneys or other duly authorized 
representatives. Fund Member further agrees to be fully 
cooperative in supplying any information reasonably requested 
by the Fund in the handling of claims. All decisions on 
individual claims shall be made by the Fund or its designee, 
including, without limitation, decisions concerning claim 
values, payment due on the claim, settlement, subrogation, 
litigation, or appeals.  
 
10. Excess Coverage/Reinsurance. The Fund, in its sole 
discretion, may purchase excess coverage or reinsurance for 
any or all Fund programs. In the event of a substantial change 
in terms or cost of such coverage, the Fund reserves the right to 
make adjustments to the terms and conditions of a CCS as 
allowed by the Amendment by Notice process under this 
Agreement. If any reinsurer, stop loss carrier, and/or excess 
coverage provider fails to meet its obligations to the Fund or 
any Fund Member, the Fund is not responsible for any payment 
or any obligations to Fund Member from any reinsurer, stop 
loss carrier, or excess coverage provider. 
 
11. Subrogation and Assignment of Rights. Fund Member, on its 
own behalf and on behalf of any person entitled to benefits 
under this Agreement, assigns all subrogation rights to the 
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Fund. The Fund has the right, in its sole discretion, without 
notice to Fund Member, to bring all claims and lawsuits in the 
name of Fund Member or the Fund. Fund Member agrees that 
all subrogation rights and recoveries belong first to the Fund, 
up to the amount of benefits, expenses, and attorneys’ fees 
incurred by the Fund, with the balance, if any, being paid to 
Fund Member, unless otherwise specifically stated in the 
Agreement. Award of funds to any person entitled to coverage, 
whether by judgment or settlement, shall be conclusive proof 
that the injured party has been made whole. Fund Member’s 
right to be made whole is expressly superseded by the Fund’s 
subrogation rights. If Fund Member procures alternate 
coverage for a risk covered by the Fund, the latter acquired 
coverage shall be deemed primary coverage concerning that 
risk.   
 
12. No Waiver of Subrogation Rights. Fund Member shall do 
nothing to prejudice or waive the Fund’s existing or 
prospective subrogation rights under this Agreement. If Fund 
Member has waived any subrogation right without first 
obtaining the Fund’s written approval, the Fund shall be 
entitled to recover from Fund Member any sums that it would 
have been able to recover absent such waiver. Recoverable 
amounts include attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. 
 
13. Appeals. Fund Member shall have the right to appeal any 
written decision or recommendation to the Fund’s Board of 
Trustees, and the Board’s determination will be final. Any 
appeal shall be made in writing to the Board Chair within 30 
days of the decision or recommendation. 
 
14. Bylaws, Policies, and Procedures. Fund Member agrees to 
abide by the Bylaws of the Fund, as they may be amended from 
time to time, and any and all written policies and procedures 
established by the Fund (which are available from the Fund 
upon written request). If a change is made to the Fund’s 
Bylaws, written policies or procedures which conflicts with or 
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impairs a CCS, such change will not apply to Fund Member 
until the renewal of such CCS, unless Fund Member 
specifically agrees otherwise. 
 
15. Payments. Fund Member represents and warrants that all 
payments required under this Agreement of Fund Member shall 
be made from its available current revenues. 
 
16. Cooperation and Access. Fund Member agrees to cooperate 
and to comply in a timely manner with all reasonable requests 
for information and/or records made by the Fund. Fund 
Member further agrees to provide complete and accurate 
statements of material facts, to not misrepresent or omit such 
facts, engage in fraudulent conduct or make false statements to 
the Fund. The Fund reserves the right to audit the relevant 
records of Fund Member to determine compliance with this 
Agreement. 
 
17. Fund Member’s Designation of Coordinator. Fund Member 
agrees to designate a coordinator (Program Coordinator) for 
Fund Member on this Agreement or any CCS executed by 
Fund Member. Fund Member’s Program Coordinator shall 
have express authority to represent and to bind Fund Member, 
and the Fund will not be required to contact any other 
individual regarding matters arising from or related to this 
Agreement. Fund Member reserves the right to change its 
Program Coordinator as needed, by giving written notice to the 
Fund; such notice is not effective until actually received by the 
Fund. Notice provided to the Chief Executive Officer of Fund 
Member shall also serve as notice to the Program Coordinator. 
 
18. Security of Documents. Under this agreement the Fund may 
grant Fund Member access to sensitive or protected 
information. Fund Member agrees to assume the responsibility 
for maintaining the security of this information and to take all 
reasonable steps to avoid unauthorized disclosure of this 
information. 
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19. Insurance Terminology. The Fund is not “insurance”, but is 
instead a mechanism through which eligible governmental 
entities join together to collectively self-insure and administer 
certain risk exposures. Any reference in this Agreement to an 
insurance term or concept is coincidental, is not intended to 
characterize the Fund as “insurance” as defined by law, shall be 
deemed to apply to self-insurance, and is not to be construed as 
being contrary to the self-insurance concept.  
 
20. Representation. Fund Member authorizes the Fund to 
represent Fund Member in any lawsuit, dispute, or proceeding 
arising under or relating to any Fund program and/or coverage 
in which Fund Member participates. The Fund may exercise 
this right in its sole discretion and to the fullest extent 
permitted or authorized by law. Fund Member shall fully 
cooperate with the Fund, its designee, and the Fund’s chosen 
counsel, including, without limitation, supplying any 
information necessary or relevant to the lawsuit, dispute, or 
proceeding in a timely fashion. Subject to specific revocation, 
Fund Member designates the Fund to act as a class 
representative on its behalf in matters arising out of this 
Agreement. 
 
21. Members’ Equity. The Fund Board, in its sole discretion, may 
declare a distribution of the Fund’s members’ equity to Fund 
Members. Members’ equity belongs to the Fund. No individual 
Fund Member is entitled to an individual allocation or portion 
of members’ equity.  
 
22. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the 
Restated Interlocal Agreement, Bylaws and CCSs that are in 
effect as to Fund Member from time to time, represent and 
contain the complete understanding and agreement of the Fund 
and Fund Member, and there are no representations, 
agreements, arrangements, or undertakings, oral or written, 
between the Fund and Fund Member other than those set forth 
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in this Agreement duly executed in writing. In the event of 
conflict between the terms of this Agreement and the Restated 
Interlocal Agreement, Bylaws or any CCS, the specific terms 
of the later adopted agreement shall prevail to the extent 
necessary to resolve the conflict. This Agreement replaces all 
previous Interlocal Participation Agreements between the Fund 
and Fund Member. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this 
Agreement does not supersede any unexpired participation 
term or pending claim under an existing agreement between 
Fund Member and Fund.   
 
23. Amendment by Notice. This Agreement, including any of its 
component CCSs or coverage documents, may be amended by 
the Fund, in writing, by providing Fund Member with written 
notice before the earlier of (i) the effective date of the 
amendment or (ii) the date by which Fund Member can 
terminate without payment of late notice fees or liquidated 
damages. Unless this Agreement expressly provides otherwise, 
an amendment shall only apply prospectively and Fund 
Member shall have the right to terminate this Agreement, or a 
component CCS to which the amendment applies, before the 
amendment becomes effective, as provided in this Agreement. 
If Fund Member fails to give the Fund timely written notice of 
termination, Fund Member shall be deemed to have consented 
to the Fund’s amendment and agrees to abide by and be bound 
by the amendment, without necessity of obtaining Fund 
Member’s signature. 
 
 The Fund may amend this Agreement or any CCS effective upon 
renewal.  Amendments may be for any reason including changes 
to the terms or contribution amount.  
 
 The Fund may also amend this Agreement or any CCS, effective 
during the term of a CCS, for any reason including but not 
limited to the following:   
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a. State or federal governments, including any court, regulatory 
body or agency thereof, adopt a statute, rule, decision, or take 
any action that would substantially impact the rights or 
financial obligations of the Fund as it pertains to this 
Agreement, or any Fund program or CCS.  
 
b. The terms of the Fund’s stop-loss or excess coverage or 
reinsurance change substantially.  
 
If the Fund exercises the option to amend the Agreement or any CCS 
during the term of a CCS and prior to renewal, the Fund shall give 
Fund Member 30 days advance written notice. Fund Member will 
then have the right during the 30-day period to give the Fund written 
notice of termination of the applicable Fund program, effective upon 
the expiration of the 30-day notice period (or longer period if so 
provided by the Fund in writing).  
 
24. Severability; Interpretation. If any portion of this Agreement 
shall be declared illegal or held unenforceable for any reason, 
the remaining portions shall continue in full force and effect. 
Any questions of particular interpretation shall not be 
interpreted against the drafter of this Agreement, but rather in 
accordance with the fair meaning thereof.  
 
25. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys’ Fees. This Agreement 
shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Texas, without regard to the conflicts of law 
principles of such state. Venue for the adjudication or 
resolution of any dispute arising out of or relating to this 
Agreement shall lie in Travis County, Texas, unless otherwise 
mandated by law. In the event of a lawsuit or formal 
adjudication between Fund Member and the Fund, the 
prevailing party is entitled to recover reasonable and necessary 
attorneys’ fees that are equitable and just. 
 
26. Waiver. No provision of this Agreement will be deemed 
waived by either party unless expressly waived in writing by 
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the waiving party. No waiver shall be implied by delay or any 
other act or omission. No waiver by either party of any 
provision of this Agreement shall be deemed a waiver of such 
provision with respect to any subsequent matter relating to such 
provision. 
 
27. Assignment. This Agreement or any duties or obligations 
imposed by this Agreement shall not be assignable by Fund 
Member without the prior written consent of the Fund. 
 
28. Authorization. By the execution of this Agreement, the 
undersigned individuals warrant that they have been authorized 
by all requisite governance action to enter into and to perform 
the terms and conditions of this Agreement.  
 
29. Notice. Unless expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, 
any notice required or provided under this Agreement by either 
party to the other party shall be in writing and shall be sent by 
first class mail, postage prepaid or by a carrier for overnight 
service or by electronic means typically used in commerce. 
Notice to the Fund shall be sufficient if made or addressed as 
follows: TASB Risk Management Fund, P.O. Box 301, Austin, 
Texas 78767-0301, or tasbrmf@tasbrmf.org. Notice to a Fund 
Member shall be sufficient if addressed to the Program 
Coordinator or Fund Member’s Chief Executive Officer and 
mailed to Fund Member’s physical or electronic address of 
record on file with the Fund.  
 
30. Signatures/Counterparts. The failure of a party to provide an 
original, manually executed signature to the other party shall 
not affect the validity or enforceability of this Agreement. 
Either party may rely upon a facsimile or imaged signature as if 
it were an original. This Agreement may be executed in several 
separate counterparts, each of which shall be an original and all 
of which shall constitute one and the same instrument.  
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WHEREFORE, the parties agree to be bound by this Agreement by 
signing below. 
 
For FUND MEMBER: 
 
 
Fund Member Name:  
 
By:         






Printed Name of Fund Member’s 
Authorized Representative 
 
 For TASB Risk Management Fund Use Only 
For TASB RISK MANAGEMENT FUND: 
By:        
Chair, TASB Risk Management Fund Board of Trustees 
Date:  
  
